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Political Trials in Domestic and International Law
Eric A. Posner1

Abstract. Due process protections and other constitutional restrictions normally ensure that
citizens cannot be tried and punished for political dissent, but these same restrictions interfere
with criminal convictions of terrorists and others who pose a non-immediate but real threat to
public safety. To counter these threats, governments may use various subterfuges to avoid
constitutional protections, often with the complicity of judges, but when they do so, they risk
losing the confidence of the public, which may believe that the government targets legitimate
political opponents. This paper argues that that the amount of process enjoyed by defendants in
criminal trials reflects a balancing of these two factors: their dangerousness, on the one hand,
and the risk to legitimate political competition, on the other hand. Political trials are those in
which the defendant’s opposition to the existing government or the constitutional order is the
main issue. The paper discusses various ways in which governments and judges adjust process
protections, so that a public threat can be countered while the risks to political competition are
minimized. International trials are also discussed within this framework.
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Introduction
A political trial is a trial whose disposition—that is, usually, a finding of guilt or
innocence, followed by punishment or acquittal, of a particular individual or (sometimes)
group—depends on an evaluation of the defendant’s political attitudes and activities. In
the typical political trial, a person is tried for engaging in political opposition or violating
a law against political dissent; or for violating a broad and generally applicable law that is
not usually enforced, enforced strictly, or enforced with a strict punishment, except
against political opponents of the state or the government.
Political trials are uncommon in liberal democracies but not unknown. In the
United States, political trials were conducted in the late eighteenth century, when
Jeffersonians were convicted of violating the Sedition Act. Many people believe that
trials for sedition during the Civil War, World War I, World War II, and the Cold War
were political trials. And, recently, some have argued that future trials of suspected
terrorists after September 11 will be political trials.
These political trials bear a family resemblance to trials of deposed leaders of
enemy states, including the first Nuremberg trial of Nazi war criminals, the Tokyo trial of
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Japanese war criminals, the trials of Slobodan Milosevic and other officials of the
successor states of Yugoslavia, and the trials of perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide.
These trials have all been political trials, although burnished with legalisms: the
defendants are charged with legal violations but prosecuted because they are political
enemies of the states that operate the tribunals. The legal foundation of the trials is either
explicitly retroactive or based on very general international laws or principles that are
selectively applied against defeated or compliant states. Although recent efforts to
establish legal foundations for the trials of war criminals and dictators have resulted in
the creation of the International Criminal Court, American opposition to this court
ensures that in the near future such trials will continue to be political, rather than legal,
institutions.2
Another related group of trials occur in transitional settings, where a democratic
system succeeds an authoritarian system. These trials are not international because they
take place within a single state and involve only the nationals of that state; but they are
not ordinary domestic trials either because they straddle constitutional regimes, raising
special problems of retroactivity. Transitional trials occurred or were seriously
considered in, among other places, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Germany in
the 1990s; Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile in the 1980s; Greece and Portugal in the 1970s;
and France and other occupied countries after World War II. These trials were political
because the defendants were tried for their participation in a despised government, not for
any legal violations for which they could have been convicted during the old regime.3
Political trials of all types are heavily criticized, but some are more heavily
criticized than others. Political trials in authoritarian regimes are objectionable, of course,
but no more objectionable than authoritarianism itself. Political trials in transitional
settings are understandable if sometimes regrettable. Because these trials are retroactive,
they violate the rule of law; and to violate the rule of law during a transition to the rule of
law seems unfortunate, even paradoxical. Still, some observers defend political trials in
2

See the essays in From Nuremberg to the Hague: The Future of International Criminal Justice (Philippe
Sands ed. 2003). The Nuremberg trials—and especially the first trial of major war criminals—are the
subject of a large literature; see, e.g., Ann Tusa and Jon Tusa, The Nuremberg Trial (1983); Joseph E
Persico, Nuremberg: Infamy on Trial (1994); Robert E. Conot, Justice at Nuremberg (1983).
3
Accounts of many of these trials are collected in 2 Transitional Justice (Neil J. Kritz ed., 1995).
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the transitional setting as a way of teaching the public a lesson about the evils of the old
regime. Political trials in the international setting are open to the charge of victor’s
justice, but are often seen as expedients necessary to provide the foundation for an
international criminal legal system. This was a common defense of the Nuremberg trial.
Political trials in liberal democracies, however, have virtually no defenders; they
are reviled as a corruption of the judicial process and a betrayal of liberal principles. The
standard view in the legal literature holds that (1) governments have strong incentives to
limit process and attack their opponents; (2) judges are the guardians of due process
rights as well as political rights such as free speech; (3) during times of emergency
governments exploit public fears in order to crack down on dissent; and (4) judges should
and do stand in the government’s way—and when they do not, this is regrettable.4 The
fatal defect in this theory is the absence of a plausible account of the motivations of the
actors. Why would judges try to restrain the government, and why would the government
allow itself to be restrained by judges? History shows that judges often enthusiastically
facilitate political prosecutions, and that governments are perfectly capable of ignoring
judges who do not.5
The thesis of this Article is that domestic political trials flow naturally from the
highest obligation of liberal democracies: to defend themselves and, thus, their ideals—
that is, liberalism and democracy—from internal and external enemies who refuse to
submit to the constitutional system. Governments cannot counter all threats to the
constitutional system without sometimes using measures that are inconsistent with
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See, e.g., Geoffrey Stone, Perilous Times: Free Speech in Wartime (2004); The Constitution in Wartime
(Mark Tushnet ed. 2005); Judith Shklar, Legalism: Law, Morals, and Political Trials (1964); Michal R.
Belknap, Cold War Political Justice: The Smith Act, The Communist Part, and American Civil Liberties 37 (1977); Victor S. Navasky, Naming Names (2003) (criticizing McCarthy era trials); James Morton Smith,
Freedom’s Fetters: The Alien and Sedition Laws and American Civil Liberties (1956) (criticizing founding
era trials); Peterson and Fite, supra (criticizing World War I trials); Peter L. Steinberg, The Great “Red
Menace”: United States Prosecutions of American Communists, 1947-52 (1984) (criticizing Smith Act
trials). Hannah Arendt’s criticisms of the Eichmann trial reflects the conventional wisdom about political
trials, though she was apparently not opposed to a different kind of political trial, one conducted by an
international tribunal rather than in an Israeli court. See Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem (1994).
See also Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 Yale L.J. 1131 (1991), although Amar
emphasizes the role of the jury.
5
We will discuss many examples of the first in Part III.C.; Lincoln’s refusal to obey Justice Taney’s order
in Ex parte Merryman is the preeminent American example of the second.
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normal constitutional restrictions.6 The problem for a government that rests on public
consent, as governments in all liberal systems do, is that if it counters the threat using
extralegal means, then the public might believe that the government will use such means
against its partisan political opponents as well as actual security threats. A public that
believes that the government will eliminate legitimate political opponents will withdraw
its support, depriving the government of its power.7 This dilemma cannot be avoided, but
a well designed political trial reduces the tension between these competing forces by
allowing the defendant qualified judicial process, enough—in the ideal case—to persuade
the public that the defendant is a threat to the constitutional system rather than an
ordinary dissenter, but not so much that the defendant will be acquitted. On this view,
there is no normative objection to a political trial per se; only of political trials that target
partisan opponents rather than public threats, and of political trials that target public
threats but also erode public confidence in government to such an extent as to interfere
with normal governance.
This argument has certain normative implications, which can again be contrasted
to those of the standard view. The normative implication of the conventional wisdom is
that judges should enforce political and process rights during emergencies more
6

Thus, this Article can be placed with recent work discussing how the president’s powers should (or should
not) change during emergences. Compare Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent
Crises Always Be Constitutional?, 112 Yale L.J. 1011 (2003) (arguing that the president should act
lawlessly and then seek public ratification), and Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 Yale
L.J. 1029 (2004) (arguing that the Constitution should be amended or interpreted so as to provide the
president with emergency powers, subject to procedural constraints). My more modest point is that any
time security concerns are heightened (whether or not there is a true “emergency”), process protections will
be relaxed, and this relaxation can be done in a manner that is consistent with basic liberal, democratic
principles, as long as one pays attention to the difference between suspects who are public threats and
suspects who are mainstream political opponents.
7
My approach is thus to treat liberal principles—like legalism, the rule of law—as instrumental rather than
ideological; this is very much in the spirit of Stephen Holmes, Lineages of the Rule of Law, in Democracy
and the Rule of Law 19 (José María Maravall and Adam Przeworski eds., 2003) and Adam Przeworski,
Why Do Political Parties Obey the Results of Elections?, in Democracy and the Rule of Law, supra, at 114.
The approach is to ask, Why would the people with power—the wealthy, the well born, those with guns—
be willing to commit themselves to the rule of law (Holmes), elections (Przeworski), and other liberal
democratic principles? The answer is assumed to be that it lies in their self-interest, not in the “inherently
binding power of norms” or “legitimacy” (Holmes, supra, at 24). See also Barry Weingast, The Political
Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law, 91 Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev. 245 (1997) (presenting a model
of politics in which the government exercises self-restraint in order to avoid sanctions from opposition
groups); and, for a related approach by a legal scholar, Daniel A Farber, Rights as Signals, 31 J. Legal Stud.
83 (2002) (arguing that when states make constitutional commitments to protect human rights, and grant
the judiciary independence to enforce them, they signal that they have a long time horizon, and therefore
are unlikely to expropriate investments).
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vigorously than they have in the past. Political trials are simply never justified; and
judges should do all they can to prevent them from occurring.8
The normative implication of my thesis is that political trials are unavoidable and
must be tolerated, but can be better designed and managed than they often are. The
proper amount of process in the political trial trades off national security, on the one
hand, and the credibility of the prosecuting authorities, on the other hand. In a
nonpolitical trial, process has the main purpose of minimizing error and administrative
cost. In a political trial, process has the additional purpose of maintaining the credibility
of the government, or (what is the same thing) allowing the conviction of people who are
public threats while preventing the conviction of people who are mere partisan political
opponents. Because the credibility of the government is an issue, certain steps should be
taken to enhance the government’s credibility, and in the process to reduce the risk that
the trial is being used for partisan purposes. These steps include involving judges and
jurors from opposition parties, and allowing defendants to mount political defenses.
Part I provides the historical, legal, and academic background to the political trial.
Part II explains why rational governments in a liberal democratic systems will sometimes
conduct political trials. Part III discusses ways in which these trials can be designed and
managed so as not to undermine the principle of political competition at the heart of
liberal democracy. Part IV extends this discussion to related trials, including trials of
enemy combatants, transitional trials, and international criminal trials.
I. Preliminaries
A.

Historical Background
In the classic domestic political trial, the defendant is tried for opposing the

government or ruling class. The political trial need not be based on retroactive
lawmaking, though it often is. There may be an existing law that prohibits opposition to
the government; if so, the defendant may be tried under that law and convicted. Such a
trial is political, though all process rules may be observed, because the defendant’s guilt
or innocence depends on her political beliefs or activities. The reason that political trials
are often retroactive, either in form or in fact, is that generally applicable laws forbidding
8

See, e.g., Stone, supra.
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political opposition are highly unpopular, and frequently unworkable. A general
prohibition of criticisms of the government is draconian in all but the most authoritarian
states. Governments depend on criticism and, even when they do not, they are usually too
weak to outlaw it. In democracies, legislators shy from laws prohibiting political
opposition because the legislators know that these laws can be used against them if their
party loses power. Even when the majority favors such laws, opposition parties may have
enough strength in the legislature or in other institutions such as the judiciary to prevent
the majority party from passing laws that have real force.
For these reasons, governments that seek to harass or eliminate political
opponents through the judicial process usually resort to generally applicable laws against
subversion, conspiracy, disorderly conduct, incitement to violate the laws, and so forth,
but enforce them only against people who pose a genuine threat to their power or to
public security, not against mainstream political rivals or ordinary citizens blowing off
steam.
The domestic political trial can be located on a spectrum that extends from the
summary execution or detention at one end, to the procedurally correct trial at the other
end. At the one extreme, the government identifies and then captures or kills its
opponents without informing them of the charges, giving them a chance to defend
themselves, or involving independent agents such as judges. As one moves along the
spectrum, one adds procedural protections: general, public, prospective substantive rules,
the right to a trial, lawyers, judges, rules of evidence, rights to cross examine, jurors, and
so forth. Military trials and deportation hearings fall at the midpoint of the spectrum; the
ordinary criminal trial at the other end. As process increases, the government loses its
power to disable its political opponents, but it gains something as well: the ability to
claim credibly that its prosecutions serve the public interest rather than (solely) the
government’s interest in its own survival. Part II describes the logic of this theory in more
detail.
As noted in the Introduction, not all political trials are domestic. Many are
international, and others are transitional. Table 1 provides some historical examples of
each type; the regular domestic trials are drawn from American history. Note that the
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classification of many of these cases as “political trials” is controversial, and I include
them only because they recur in the literature.9
Table 1: Political Trials10
Panel A: International
Year

Name

Result

1945

Nuremberg Trial

19 convictions (12 executions); 3 acquittals

1946–48

Tokyo War Crimes Trial

25 convictions (7 executions)

1993–present

International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia

30 convictions; 2 acquittals (through 2003)

Panel B: Transitional
Year

Name

Result

1649

Charles I

execution

1780s

American Revolution: Trials of Loyalists

various

1792

French Revolution: Trial of Louis XVI

execution

1944

French Trials of Nazi Collaborators

various

1974

Greek Trials of former government officials

convictions

1989

German trials of border guards and former leaders

convictions and acquittals

Panel C: Domestic (United States)
Year
1798–
1801

Name
Matthew Lyon and other
prominent Republicans

Charge11
violation of Sedition Act

9

Result
convictions in nearly every case

In particular, the Hiss trial does not seem political. Hiss was prosecuted for violating the law against
perjury, and his trials (the first ended in deadlock) seem to have been fair. See Allen Weinstein, Perjury:
The Hiss-Chambers Case 412-502 (1978) (describing the trials); the same is true for the Sacco and Vanzetti
trial, and the trial of the Rosenbergs. But many people regarded these trials as political at the time because
the defendants had radical political views, and they assumed that the government had trumped up charges
in order to weaken political opposition. See David Caute, The Great Fear: The Anti-Communist Purge
Under Truman and Eisenhower 61 (1978) (describing the public reaction to Hiss: “obviously guilty not
only to conservatives but to Cold War liberals, obviously innocent, the victim of a frame-up to almost all
who deplored the purge”).
10
For international tribunals, see Tusa and Tusa, supra, at 504 (Nuremberg); Richard H. Minear, Victor’s
Justice: The Tokyo War Crimes Trial 31 (2001) (Tokyo); James Meernik, Victor’s Justice or the Law?, 47
J. Conflict Res. 140, 154 (2003) (Yugoslavia tribunal). For Transitions, see Michael Walzer, Regicide and
Revolution (1974); Kritz, supra. For American domestic trials, see Political Trials in History: From
Antiquity to the Present (Ron Christenson ed., 1991); American Political Trials (Michal R. Belknap ed.,
1994). On Sedition Act trials, see Smith, supra; on civil war trials, see J.G. Randall, Constitutional
Problems Under Lincoln (rev. ed. 1951); on World War I era trials, see H.C. Peterson and Gilbert C. Fite,
Opponents of War, 1917-1918 (1957); on Smith Act trials, see Steinberg, supra; on the Haymarket trial, see
Paul Avrich, The Haymarket Tragedy (1984); John F. Bannan and Rosemary S. Bannan, Law, Morality and
Vietnam: The Peace Militants and the Courts (1974). Other sources are cited infra.
11
When multiple charges were made, the main charge or a representative charge is listed.
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1805

Impeachment of Samuel
Chase

misconduct

acquittal

1807

Aaron Burr

treason

acquittal

1863

Vallandigham and other
Southern sympathizers

violation of martial law

conviction by military commission;
detention and exile

1868

Impeachment of Andrew
Johnson

violation of Tenure of
Office Act

acquittal

1886

Haymarket riot

conspiracy to commit
murder, riot

conviction of eight defendants;
execution of four; three were jailed,
then pardoned

1918

Debs and other opponents
of American involvement
in World War I

sedition

convictions; some sentences later
commuted

1918

Industrial Workers of the
World (multiple trials)

conspiracy to obstruct
World War I

mainly convictions

1919

Abrams and other
anarchists

sedition

four convictions; exile

1921

Sacco and Vanzetti

murder

conviction, execution

1923

Garvey

mail fraud

conviction, deportation

1944

Dilling and other Nazi
sympathizers

Smith Act violations

mistrial, then dismissal

1949

Dennis and other
Communists

Smith Act violations

convictions

1949

Hiss

perjury

conviction

1950

Hollywood 10

contempt of Congress

convictions

1951

Rosenbergs

espionage

convictions, executions

1968

Catonsville 9

destruction of
government property

convictions

1968

Boston 5

conspiracy to obstruct
draft

convictions, reversed on appeal

1969

Chicago 8

incitement to riot

some convictions, reversed on
appeal

1974

Wounded Knee

various offenses related to
occupation of town

case dismissed after trial

1989–90

North and Poindexter

defrauding the
government

convictions; North’s was overturned
on appeal; Poindexter was pardoned

1999

Impeachment of Bill
Clinton

perjury and obstruction of
justice

acquittal

9

There have been few international political trials of leaders or major officials.12
For an international criminal trial to occur, a state must deliver up leaders for prosecution
by another state or else suffer a decisive military defeat. But no state willingly yields its
leaders, and throughout most of history victorious states saw no value in conducting trials
of the leaders of vanquished states. Before the modern era, leaders were executed,
imprisoned, exiled, or welcomed as guest-hostages. Tamerlane displayed Bayezid I in a
cage after defeating him in the battle of Ankara in 1402. The Thirty Years War ended in
1648 with a settlement, and no leaders were tried or punished. Napoleon ended his days
on the island of St. Helena. The War of 1812, the Crimean War, the Franco-Prussian
War, and the Russo-Japanese War all ended in political settlements. Germany was
decisively defeated in World War I, but the desultory efforts to prosecute Kaiser Wilhelm
collapsed when Holland (sic!) refused to extradite him. Britain abandoned its efforts to
prosecute Ottoman war criminals because it could not maintain control over Turkish
territory.13 The pattern continued after World War II. Most wars ended in a political
settlement or suspension of hostilities that failed to provide for trials; these wars included
the conflicts between Pakistan and India, the conflicts between Israel and Arab states, the
Korean War, the Vietnam War, the war between Britain and Argentina over the Falkland
Islands, the Soviet-Afghan War, and the first Gulf War. The U.S. prosecuted Manuel
Noriega for drug crimes after it ousted him from the helm of Panama, but this was a far
cry from Nuremberg. The U.S. has no interest in prosecuting Saddam Hussein, preferring
to leave him to the Iraqis, albeit with substantial U.S. assistance and influence as well.14
It is ironic that Nuremberg brought respectability to the political trial, as it has had
virtually no value as a precedent for trying leaders of a state that has started wars, or

12

Excluded are ordinary military trials of captured enemy soldiers or noncombatants who have committed
war crimes. In some ways these are political trials, but in the main they are not: they are based on laws for
which there is an international consensus.
13
See Gary Bass, Stay the Hand of Vengeance (2001).
14
The statute authorizing the trial passed only with the approval of the U.S.; and the U.S. has sent a team of
attorneys to participate in the preparation of the trial. See Neil A. Lewis and David Johnston, The Struggle
For Iraq: War Crimes; U.S. Team Is Sent To Develop Case In Hussein Trial, The New York Times, March
7, 2004, at 1.
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holding international trials of war criminals.15 Only the Yugoslavia conflict, fifty years
later, resulted in major war crimes trials before an international tribunal.16
Trials in transitional regimes, by contrast, have been common; Panel B lists just a
few of the dozens that have occurred. The transitional or successor trial is intended to
punish members of the old regime—to do substantial justice—and persuade the public
that the old regime was evil so that the new regime will be seen as a legitimate
replacement.
The most common type of political trial is that which occurs within a regime.
Panel C is confined to the American experience, but it is important to remember that
political trials are more common in authoritarian regimes than in liberal democracies
because opposition to the government is usually illegal. Britain, France, and the other
established democracies also have a long history of political trials.17 American political
trials (or trials that are arguably political even if not obviously so) have occurred most
often during times of upheaval: during the founding era, the Civil War, World War I,
World War II, the height of the Cold War in the late 1940s and early 1950s, and the
Vietnam War.
Many political trials are clearly identifiable as such because they involve laws that
target people for their political views or the peaceful expression of those views. American
examples include the trials of Jeffersonians under the Sedition Act at the end of the
eighteenth century, and the trial of Vallandigham and other government opponents during
the Civil War. However, most political trials in liberal democracies involve selective

15

Minow argues that Nuremberg inspired the trials of Adolf Eichmann in Israel, Argentina’s prosecution of
members of the military, Germany’s border guard trials, and the trial of Jaruzelski in Poland, but, as she
also notes, this claim is in tension with “the enormous gap in time between the Nuremberg trials and any
comparable effort to prosecute war crimes in international settings.” See Martha Minow, Between
Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History after Genocide and Mass Violence 27 (1998); see also the
valuable discussion of Argentina’s experience in Carlos Santiago Nino, Radical Evil on Trial (1996)
(discussing relationship between Nuremberg trial and trial of Argentine leaders). Whatever the truth about
Nuremberg, I have found no support in the historical literature for her claim that the Tokyo tribunal has had
similar positive influence. Id. Most accounts of it are decidedly negative; e.g., the chapters in The Tokyo
War Crimes Trial: An International Symposium (C. Hosoya et al. eds. 1986), especially the lucid
introduction by B.V.A. Röling, one of the judges (B.V.A. Röling, Introduction, in id., at 15). See also the
historical accounts cited elsewhere.
16
There are a few other ambiguous cases, including the Rwanda and Sierra Leone tribunals.
17
France is responsible for one of the most famous political trials of all, the Dreyfus affair. For Britain’s
many contributions, see Peter Hain, Political Trials in Britain (1984).
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enforcement of generally applicable laws against political opponents. Prosecution of
political activists for loitering or disturbing the peace, when identical activities by
political supporters or ordinary people are tolerated, is political. In these trials, defendants
typically argue that they are being singled out for their political views, while the
government argues that it is enforcing the law impartially. Examples include the Chicago
8 and Boston 5 trials, where prominent opponents of the Vietnam War were prosecuted
under general laws prohibiting incitement to riot and conspiracy to obstruct the draft.
In many political trials, the political conflict is displaced to the facts. The
defendant argues that the government has invented facts, or is manipulating evidence, in
order to obtain a conviction of a political opponent for violation of a non-selectively
enforced law. Sacco and Vanzetti did not argue that the government enforced the law
against murder selectively, or that the law against murder was a political law; they argued
that the government set them up. So did Alger Hiss and the Rosenbergs—all of whom
denied that they engaged in espionage. These cases can be hard to distinguish from
nonpolitical trials where an ordinary criminal defendant argues that the government set
him or her up in order to show that it is tough on crime, or to appeal to racist or
xenophobic sentiments of its constituents. O.J. Simpson could make this argument, as can
any minority defendant who has a plausible claim that the prosecution is racist or
politically motivated. In these twilight cases, the question comes down to whether the
general public or relevant observers such as minority communities are receptive to the
political defense.
Finally, one should note that trials are sometimes regarded as political trials
simply because the law is controversial. Examples include trials for violation of sodomy
laws, for murder where the defendant claims the battered-spouse defense, and for hate
crimes. However, I exclude these cases from my definition because the trial is rarely
about silencing a political opponent of the government or of the constitutional order.18

18

I also exclude trials in which the government tries to enforce a generally applicable law (say, against
murder) but the jury nullifies the law and acquits a guilty defendant for political reasons. In so doing, the
jury is licensing the murder of its political opponents. See, e.g., Dallin H. Oaks and Marvin S. Hull,
Carthage Conspiracy: The Trial of the Accused Assassins of Joseph Smith (1975) (describing the acquittal
of Smith’s murderers by a jury consisting of anti-Mormon citizens). But, however objectionable, this is not
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With so many kinds of political trials, reliance on simple definitions is hazardous.
Nonetheless, one can identify the core meaning of the political trial. On this definition, a
political trial occurs when the government uses the judicial process against its opponents
(including foreign enemies and internal dissidents) who have not violated formal,
generally enforced laws or have violated only formal laws against political dissent. This
can happen when a formal law prohibits opposition to the government or the
constitutional order that the government protects, in which case the normal judicial
process rules can be respected, or when charges are trumped up, and the defendant is
convicted of violating laws that she has not violated or that are very general and not
enforced against people unless they are critics of the government. In the latter case, the
conviction must occur with the complicity of the judge and/or jury; normal process
protections are relaxed.19 Political opponents, as used here, include leaders and civilians
of hostile foreign states as well as domestic partisans.20
B. Literature
Most Americans prize this country’s tradition of tolerance for political dissent,
and the political trial would appear to have no place in such a tradition. Today, political
trials are associated with various unjust or dubious events: trials of draft resisters and
government critics during the Vietnam War, of harmless eccentrics or well-meaning
dissenters during the Cold War, of labor organizers and peace activists during World War

a problem of the government trying to maintain its power by eliminating its political opponents, and thus
outside the scope of this paper.
19
For a discussion of the relationship between trials to determine whether a person is an enemy combatant
and the political trial is complex, see Part IV.A.
20
My definition falls between the two extremes in the literature. Kirchheimer (supra, at 49) limits political
trials to trials that have partisan motivations; Belknap includes the trial that “is intended to affect the
structure, personnel, or policies of government, that is the product or has its outcome determined by
political controversy, or that results from the efforts of a group within society having control of the
machinery of government to use the courts to disadvantage its rivals in a power struggle which is not itself
immediately political or to preserve its own economic or social position.” Belknap, American Political
Trials, supra, at xvi. This definition would require us to classify almost any trial as political. The definition
I use excludes trials (fairly) based on laws that derive from the constitutional bargain; of course, if one
thinks of the constitutional bargain as itself “political,” then all trials are political, but then one can’t make
a useful distinction between routine criminal trials and the kind of troublesome trials that dominate the
literature.
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I. To say that a trial is political is always to condemn it. The mainstream literature on
these events accepts this popular view.21
However, there has always been a counterpoint in the literature, stimulated by a
signal event in the history of the political trial, the Nuremberg trial of major war
criminals after World War II. Many commentators have been unable to allow their
reservations about “normal” political trials to apply to Nuremberg, where a political trial
seemed preferable to the alternatives—the release of the Nazi leaders on the ground that
they violated no international law, or their summary execution on the ground that they
were evil men and had lost the war. Thus, there is a tension: if the political trial at
Nuremberg was desirable, then one must abandon the popular view that all political trials
are objectionable. But if not all political trials are objectionable, what are the grounds for
condemning the trials of dissenters in the United States?
This tension permeates Judith Shklar’s prominent discussion of the Nuremberg
trial.22 Shklar defends the trial on the ground that it promoted the rule of law by applying
the forms of legality to a novel set of circumstances. It was, in essence, a theatrical act of
legislation. The trial also served valuable political ends by helping discredit Nazism in
Germany and awaken German’s dormant legal traditions.23 These arguments are in the
service of Shklar’s main thesis, a critique of “legalism”—the ideology under which the
rule of law becomes an end in itself rather than a means to the accomplishment of liberal
values—and the legalistic view that all political trials are objectionable because they
violate legal norms.24

21

See supra note __.
See Shklar, supra.
23
By contrast, she viewed the Tokyo trial as a “dud,” because, in her view, Japanese traditions and culture
were not receptive to Western style legalism, Shklar, supra, at 181, and that the Japanese simply did not
behave as badly as the Germans—no crimes against humanity, only war crimes and crimes of aggression—
and thus could portray themselves as moral equivalents of the victors. The first point is simplistic: Japanese
ethical traditions differ in complex ways from Western ethical traditions but if her claim is that the
Japanese were less likely to condemn the behavior of fellow citizens than the behavior of foreigners, this
feature of their moral system would hardly distinguish them from the Germans or the Americans.
24
Shklar, supra, at 156. See also Bernard D. Meltzer, “War Crimes”: The Nuremberg Trial and the Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia, 30 Valparaiso U.L. Rev. 895, 907 (1996). Shklar’s arguments would be echoed
in Michael Walzer’s defense of the trials of Charles I and Louis XVI, which, by symbolizing the end of
monarchy, performed a valuable political function, the ushering in of democracy. See Walzer, supra. For a
contrasting view, see Minear, supra, who attacks the Tokyo war crimes tribunal for violating the norms of
legality. His view appears to be that enemy leaders should not be tried if they are “sincere men”; otherwise,
22
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However, Shklar flatly denies that domestic political trials can have a valuable
role in a liberal constitutional order.25 Consider her analysis of Judge Hand’s opinion in
Dennis.26 Rejecting the defendants’ First Amendment challenge to their convictions
under the Smith Act, Hand argued that Justice Holmes’ “clear and present danger” test of
the First Amendment was too narrow; Congress ought to have the power to address future
dangers that are probable but not too remote. At the height of the Cold War, Hand
believed that international, that is, Soviet-directed, communism posed just such a danger,
and for that reason the conviction of the Dennis defendants was justified.
Shklar disagrees. Citing Justice Jackson’s opinion on appeal, she argues that the
political trial corrupts the judiciary:
The judicial process, Justice Jackson observed, is not designed to deal with radical
political movements. It deals with individual offenders against law, not with the
elimination of political groups. To attempt such tasks is to injure the judicial
process, because the principle of legality cannot survive them.27
This is an argument by definition: because the judicial process is designed to enforce the
law, it cannot be used to eliminate political enemies. But why not? Why can’t it do both?
Indeed, Jackson concurred with the majority’s affirmance of Hand’s decision, apparently
because he believed that the challenge posed by communism could be cabined as an
international threat; judicial persecution of communists would not necessarily result in
judicial persecution of legitimate, indigenous opposition groups.28
The quotation above makes it appear that Shklar thinks that courts can convict
people only for past acts and not on the basis of future threats, but she backs off from that
position, which would be in tension with her critique of the legalist mentality, and instead

summary execution would be appropriate. Id., 179-80. He appears to condemn Nuremberg as well (id., at
169).
25
See Shklar, supra, at 220.
26
United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201 (2nd Cir. 1950).
27
See Shklar, supra, at 217.
28
See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 561 (1951) (Jackson, conc.). That Communists ought to be
granted a lower level of process was apparently a general view of the Supreme Court; see William M.
Wiecek, The Legal Foundations of Domestic Anticommunism: The Background of Dennis v. United States
2001 Sup. Ct. Rev. 375 (2001). This was also the view of Truman, who “was willing, as were some other
liberals, to destroy the CPUSA in order to maintain basic liberties of all other citizens.” Steinberg, supra, at
290.
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argues that Hand was wrong about the facts. The threat posed by American communists
was remote, not probable; therefore, it was wrong to imprison them.29
If the mobilization of the judiciary were a necessary muting of law in time of war
one would not complain, especially if this war, like those in the past, had a
foreseeable end. However, the Cold War is not like that, nor does it require the
abandonment of the principle of legality. This abandonment is a necessity
conjured up by an abandonment of pragmatic liberalism and a paranoia created by
an interminable, frustrating, and exhausting conflict.30
Shklar thus adopts a legalistic solution to the problem of political trials: acceptable during
wars with a foreseeable end, and not otherwise. This position is inconsistent with her
critique of legalistic thinking. She ought to approve or disapprove of political trials just to
the extent that they promote liberal values such as tolerance. Such liberal values, she
concedes, can be promoted only in a society that is secure against external and internal
threats. It follows that a political trial that improves security (such as at time of war, but
not only then) may be justified. She disagrees with Judge Hand about the nature of the
threat posed by the American communist party; it is only this disagreement about the
facts, not a philosophical or analytical demonstration that the political trial during times
of peace is inconsistent with liberal values, that drives her critique of Dennis.31
Indeed, one could argue that the Dennis case was less a political trial than the
Nuremberg case. As I will discuss below, the promoters of the Nuremberg trial sought to
persuade the world of the evils of the Nazi system, and the virtues of the allied states that
opposed it. By contrast the Dennis trial was motivated less by partisan goals than by the
belief that the American Communist Party was providing assistance to a dangerous
foreign enemy.
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Shklar, supra, at 215.
Id., at 219.
31
History has been kinder to Hand than to Shklar. The disclosure of the Venona cables and the opening of
Soviet archives in the 1990s revealed that the CPUSA was dominated by the Soviet Union and used for
espionage purposes, although the effectiveness of the Soviet espionage network in the United States had
been undermined by defections, counterintelligence, and purges by the end of World War II. See Allen
Weinstein and Alexander Vassiliev, The Haunted Wood 339-44 (1999); Harvey Klehr, et al., The Soviet
World of American Communism (1998).
30
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Subsequent writings of political theorists have not departed much from Shklar’s
conclusions.32 Abel and Marsh, for example, argue that political trials may generate good
political outcomes—the Supreme Court’s contraction of libel law and expansion of rights
of criminal defendants are among their examples—but they define political trial so
broadly as to encompass virtually any case where the court’s political views may play a
role in the decision, hence virtually all constitutional cases decided by the Supreme
Court.33 In doing so, they lose sight of the classic trial against political dissent, which is
the source of so much discomfort, and which they do not seem to defend. Christenson
argues that a political trial brings “social contradictions” out in the open, where they can
be discussed and acknowledged—but, whatever one thinks of this theory, it is hardly a
reason for a government to conduct a political trial when it otherwise would have no such
inclination.34
The political science literature is valuable but excessively general. My concern is
not with whether political trials may be justifiable in the abstract, but how government
can lower process protections when justified by security concerns without generating
suspicions that it is targeting its political opponents. This is a question of legal and
institutional design.35

32

Otto Kirchheimer’s exhaustive book on political trials is mainly descriptive and analytical—he
categorizes political trials, show how they work, the tensions, and so forth. His few normative comments
seem to reflect ambivalence but the main tone is one of distaste. In this way he anticipates Shklar, though
he does not draw her dogmatic line around political trials in liberal democracies. See Otto Kirchheimer,
Political Justice (1961). Others have defended political trials in transitional settings; see, e.g., Bass, supra
(2000) (arguing that war crimes tribunals may prevent victims from taking justice into their own hands);
Walzer, supra (approving of the trials of Charles I and Louis XVI for establishing a symbolic break with
monarchy).
33
Abel and Marsh, supra.
34
Christenson, supra.
35
The legal literature is also mostly unrelated to the arguments in this paper. The post-World War II
debates about positivism were inspired by political trials, such as the famous post-war prosecution of a
woman who informed on her husband under Nazi rule in order to get rid of him. However, this political
trial was the vehicle for investigating the concept of law, and the chief figures in the debate—Hart and
Fuller—did not discuss how political trials should be conducted. Oddly, they both appear to think that the
trial would be morally justified, with the main difference being that Hart thought Germany should pass an
ex post facto law before prosecuting the woman while Fuller thought that the courts should declare Nazi
law void and enforce the law that existed at the time of the Weimar Republic. Compare H.L.A. Hart,
Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 593 (1958) and Lon L. Fuller,
Positivism and Fidelity to Law—A Reply To Professor Hart, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 630 (1958). It is doubtful
that their jurisprudential disagreements could explain this disagreement about means.
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C. Legal Background
Political trials do not violate domestic or international law.36 The U.S.
Constitution expressly authorizes one type of political trial—the impeachment. Although
article 2, section 4 says that the president and other civil officers may be impeached for
“high crimes and misdemeanors,”37 and one could argue that this means that they can be
impeached only for criminal violations, the general view is that impeachment may be
based on political expediency. The articles of impeachment of both Andrew Johnson and
Bill Clinton included political as well as legal claims.38 And many impeachments of
judges have been based on political charges, such as that of undermining public
confidence in the court.39
The U.S. Constitution does not ban political trials of other public officials; nor
does it say that such political trials can occur only through impeachment proceedings. It
also does not ban political trials of ordinary citizens. A number of provisions, however,
place severe limits on the government’s ability to conduct political trials.40
The First Amendment is the basic constraint: it prohibits Congress from passing
laws against political opposition in general, and thus from authorizing the prosecution of
individuals solely on the ground of their opposition to government policy. However, in
times of stress the courts have relaxed First Amendment constraints. During the Cold
War the Supreme Court permitted a crackdown on the American Communist Party, in

Another literature focuses on the choices faced by transitional governments; see, e.g., Ruti Teitel,
Transitional Justice (2002), Claus Offe, Varieties of Transition: The East European and East German
Experience (1996). Posner and Vermeule, supra; Mark Osiel, Mass Atrocity, Collective Memory, and the
Law (1997); Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness (1998). I will address some of the
arguments in this literature in Part IV.
36
I will discuss international law in Part IV.
37
U.S. Const., art. 2, s. 4.
38
See Articles of Impeachment Against Andrew Johnson, art. X (1868) (“... did attempt to bring into
disgrace, ridicule, hatred, contempt and reproach, the Congress of the United States, and the several
branches thereof, to impair and destroy the regard and respect of all the good people of the United States
for the Congress and legislative powers thereof, (which all officers of the government ought inviolably to
preserve and maintain.) and to excite the odium and resentment of all the good people of the United States
against Congress and the laws by it duly and constitutionally enacted”); Articles of Impeachment Against
William Jefferson Clinton (1998) (“William Jefferson Clinton has undermined the integrity of his office,
has brought disrepute on the Presidency, has betrayed his trust as President, and has acted in a manner
subversive of the rule of law and justice, to the manifest injury of the people of the United States”).
39
Raoul Berger, Impeachment: The Constitutional Problems 53-59 (1973).
40
There are also political trials under the laws of the states, and various state constitutional and statutory
constraints, which I will ignore. A few examples are discussed in Belknap, supra.
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part because of its connection with the Soviet threat.41 The Supreme Court subsequently
repudiated this line of cases but only after the Cold War had begun to thaw.42 Current
doctrine holds that the government can target political opponents only if they cause harm
in the course of their political activities (such as robbing a bank to finance their party) or
pose an “imminent threat” to public order (such as inciting mob violence).43
The main constraint on political trials in a legal regime in which overtly partisan
laws are unconstitutional is the due process clause, which requires the judge to grant the
defendant process rights. The great importance of the due process clause lies in its
restrictions on simple fraudulent (or aggressive) conduct on the part of the executive. If
the defendant has not violated any laws, not even generally applicable laws, the
government may be tempted to cut procedural corners. At the extreme, the government
fabricates evidence and bullies witnesses. None of this is unknown, but in the more
common case the defendant’s legal guilt is ambiguous, and the government strengthens
its case by withholding information from the defendant’s lawyer, forces him to confess to
a crime he did not commit or manipulates him into such a confession, plays on the fears
of the jury, and so forth. The various due process and related constitutional rights—to
have a lawyer, to have a jury, to call witnesses, to examine evidence, to cross-examine
witnesses—limit this kind of prosecutorial abuse.
The due process clause does not prohibit prosecutorial discretion: prosecutors are
free to bring cases against X rather than Y, even though they committed the same crimes
or even though Y’s crime is worse. The prosecutor might have any number of motives:
resource constraints and difficulty of proof, the value of making an example of one
defendant rather than another, and so forth. The Supreme Court has held only that the
prosecutor’s motive cannot be invidious, and this typically means that the prosecutor
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See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
Yates v. United States, 354 US 298 (1957); see generally Belknap, supra, at 157
43
The current doctrine is there must be “imminent harm” (Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)) but
that has not always been the case, as discussed in the text above. In other democratic countries such as
Germany, which proscribes the Nazi party, and Turkey, which periodically proscribes Islamic parties, there
is no such requirement. See John E. Finn, Electoral Regimes and the Proscription of Anti-democratic
Parties, in The Democratic Experience and Political Violence 51, 70-74 (David C. Rapoport and Leonard
Weinberg eds., 2001) (listing these proscriptions as well as those in other countries); Walter F. Murphy,
Excluding Political Parties: Problems for Democratic and Constitutional Theory, in Germany and Its Basic
Law 173, 180-87 (Paul Kirchhof and Donald P. Kommers eds., 1993).
42
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cannot have racist motives (for example) or the motive of punishing a defendant for
asserting a legal right in a prior case. Although bringing prosecutions for political ends
would probably violate the equal protection clause, courts are so deferential—they
require that proof of the government’s motive rather than just a pattern of prosecuting
political opponents who happen to violate general laws—that there is no discernable
restriction on this practice.44
A final important constraint on the political trial in the U.S. is structural. The
separation of powers requires, in most cases, some degree of cooperation among all three
branches if a political trial is to succeed. Congress can block political trials by declining
to enact laws that target political opponents, refusing to enact very general laws that can
be selectively enforced against political opponents, and defunding or otherwise
constraining executive branch officials and judges who favor political trials.45 The
executive can undermine political prosecutions authorized by Congress by refusing to
pursue them with zeal, or, where authorized, by establishing regulations that constrain its
own officials.46 The judiciary can undermine political prosecutions by throwing up
procedural barriers such as burdens of proof, refusing requests for secrecy, and
interpreting the constitutional provisions mentioned above in an expansive fashion.47 As
each institution wants to protect itself, and as each institution (except for the presidency)
is always staffed by members of both parties, political trials (at the federal level) of
members of mainstream parties are rare. Instead, political trials have been conducted
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See Teah R. Lupton, Prosecutorial Discretion, 90 Georgetown L.J. 1279, 1286-87 & n. 651 (2002) ; e.g.,
Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985) (upholding prosecution of draft resisters selected because they
had expressed intention not to register); U.S. v. Hastings, 126 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 1997) (upholding
prosecution despite prosecution memo that identified defendant’s political party). See generally United
States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 463-66 (1996) (describing the high standard for asserting a selective
prosecution claim).
45
However, various administrations have argued that the president’s Article II powers authorize him to
detain and try enemy combatants without congressional authorization. The Supreme Court has, so far,
declined to express a view on this argument; see, for its most recent statement, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124
S.Ct. 2633, 2639 (2004).
46
A good example of this is the foot-dragging of the Acting Secretary of Labor during the Red Scare of the
1920s; also, Attorney General Biddle’s reluctance to enforce the Smith Act during World War II, except
when prodded by Roosevelt. See Belknap, supra, at 38-40.
47
E.g., Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957), which narrowed the Smith Act. Even before Yates,
many trial judges declined to impose the maximum penalty for Smith Act violations; see Belknap, supra, at
158.
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mainly against people whom both parties regard as political opponents, usually extremists
at both ends of the political spectrum.48
All of what has been said so far is confined to the American experience; political
trials in other constitutional democracies are usually not as heavily regulated by
constitutional provisions or tradition. The impeachment power was frequently used by the
British parliament in its historical efforts to rein in the King; these political trials are
generally thought to have enhanced liberty and the rule of law, because they were used
against the person who posed the chief threat to them. Impeachment was also a powerful
tool against official corruption in all parts of government. This history influenced the
drafters of the American constitution, who included the impeachment power in part as a
bulwark against the feared monarchical tendencies of a president, and in part as a lever
against corruption.49
Much has been written about impeachment recently, and so my focus will be on
the normal criminal trial in the American system, when it is used for political ends.
II. Theory
A. Liberal Legalism
Legalism is the view that courts should resolve social conflicts by applying
preexisting rules to the conduct of individuals, who are given an opportunity to defend
themselves. The defendant has a right to make a defense, call witnesses, cross-examine
witnesses, have an impartial judge and jury, and so forth. This package of rights is known
collectively as the right to due process. Legalism can be understood as the view that the
right to judicial process is paramount, and should never be violated, or only in the most
unusual conditions.50
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Including the American Communist Party (Dennis, supra) and the Ku Klux Klan (e.g., Bryant v.
Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 60 (1928) (upholding state law that required KKK member to register with state)).
The view that reconstruction era trials of KKK members were political is defended in Kermit L. Hall,
Political Power and Constitutional Legitimacy: The South Carolina Ku Klux Klan Trials, 1871-1872 (1984)
(arguing that the trials were used to consolidate Republican power in the South); however, Hall’s definition
of political trial is broader than that used here.
49
See Berger, supra, at 7-52; Peter Charles Hoffer and N.E.H. Hull, Impeachment in America, 1635-1805
(1984).
50
Legalism is more or less synonymous with the notion of the rule of law. On this, see the essays collected
in Democracy and the Rule of Law, supra.
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Legalism is not incompatible with laws against political opposition. A law that
bans criticism of the state or government is such a law; a court could enforce the law
without violating the right to judicial process as long as the defendant is given the
opportunity to defend himself. Thus, an authoritarian state can have legalistic institutions,
as Germany did prior to the Nazi era. The joint commitment to legalism and political
tolerance is “liberal legalism,” which includes the idea that courts should not permit the
government to ban political speech or opposition except when it causes immediate
harm—for example, incitement to riot.51
Political trials cannot occur in a regime of liberal legalism as long as legal
institutions uphold this ideal. Most real democracies only approximate liberal legalism;
they sometimes enact laws against political opposition. But the more common type of
political trial occurs when process is relaxed in violation of the ideal of legalism so that
general laws that do not target political opponents can be used as a pretext for doing just
that.
From the perspective of liberal legalism, such trials are illegitimate unless, as
Shklar suggests, there is something like a state of war or civil insurrection.52 Shklar
allows liberal states to relax their own principles in order to defend themselves, but as
noted above, she tries to place this exception within a legalistic framework. If a court
determines that a state of war exists, then it might relax the rules of process or defer to
executive action such as the establishment of military commissions.53 Why shouldn’t
courts relax process if a substantial threat short of war exists? Shklar insists that such
thinking is “utopian” and unpragmatic, and that courts should not be involved in deterring
mere threats. But she does not persuasively explain why relaxing process in this way
violates liberal principles.
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This seems to be Shklar’s view with respect to the domestic setting, which puts great weight on the harm
principle. Shklar, supra, at 60-70.
52
Id., at 219-20.
53
The lure of legalism remains, however, as can be seen in the judicial response to the war on terror. For
example, contrast the government’s view that it can classify individuals, including Americans, as enemy
combatants with virtually no judicial oversight (a view endorsed by Justice Thomas in his dissent in Hamdi,
124 S.Ct., at 2683), and detain them for the duration of hostilities; and the Hamdi plurality’s view that a
person classified as an enemy combatant is entitled to due process protections if he wishes to contest the
classification. Id., at 2645-52.
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B. An Instrumental Theory of Liberal Legalism
Academic defenders of liberal legalism normally provide philosophical
justifications for this system, arguing that liberal legalism—also called liberal democracy,
or constitutional democracy, or the rule of law, depending on whether more emphasis is
put on liberalism or legalism—promotes welfare or fairness, or respects human dignity,
or maintains social peace more effectively than alternative systems.54 Without expressing
a view on these approaches, I will take a different approach that emphasizes rational
choice on the part of individuals or groups with power. I approach liberal legalism not as
a system of values imposed on the government, but as a reflection of the principles and
attitudes that would be taken by a rational government in a democratic system, one that
seeks to maximize its political support.55
A government, as I will use the term, consists of the people who control the
policy and activities of the state. In a parliamentary system, the government is typically
controlled by a single party or a coalition of parties; the opposition, then, consists of the
party or parties that are out of power. In a presidential system, the government is
typically controlled by the president’s party, but the president may be forced to share
power with opposition parties if they control the legislature. In any event, I want to
distinguish, very roughly, the “majority party” or “party in power” from the (mainstream)
“opposition party.” In liberal democracies, the various mainstream parties compete for
power within a legal framework; the opposition party is never outlawed or forced to
suffer legal disabilities. In some democracies, extremist parties may be outlawed or
regulated; in others, they may be able to share power.
I assume that the government’s main goal is to stay in power, and that a party’s
main goal is either to maintain power (if it has it) or obtain power (it does not). All
political actors know that they cannot maintain power unless they implement policies
desired by the general public, including (but not exclusively) their political base. One
such policy is security, broadly conceived. Virtually every member of the public seeks
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See the essays in Eternally Vigilant: Free Speech in the Modern Era 32 (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R.
Stone eds., 2002).
55
This is roughly the approach of Holmes, supra, and Przeworski, supra.
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security both against internal threats such as those posed by criminal activity and against
external threats such as invasion by hostile foreign countries.
It might seem that the best way to deter crime is to deny all rights to criminals,
and simply seize and punish anyone who has committed a crime. Once the police have
satisfied themselves that a particular person committed a crime, they would punish him,
without going through the risky and tedious business of a trial. The usual objections to
this approach are that trials promote fairness and accuracy, and prevent the government
from arresting and convicting people who are vulnerable but did not commit any crime,
so as to make a show of responding to the public’s fear of crime without having to
expend resources on a criminal investigation. But these objections are not persuasive. If
the government cannot keep criminal behavior at a low level, it will lose public support.
If law enforcement routinely convicts the wrong people, then criminals will be
encouraged rather than deterred. And if people care about the fairness of criminal
procedure, then the government has no reason to use unfair procedures.
The main problem with denying procedural protections to criminal defendants is
that without such protections the government can use its monopoly on force in order to
harass, detain, or eliminate its political opponents. Authoritarian countries, in fact,
frequently do this; but liberal democracies do not. Why not?
The tempting answer is “the courts”: independent courts prevent governments in
liberal democracies from suppressing political opposition. The problem with this answer
is that authoritarian countries have courts, and many liberal democracies do not have
independent courts. The answer also begs the question why governments bent on
suppressing political opposition don’t push courts out of their way; this is exactly what
happens in weak democracies. The question, then, can be reframed, as follows: why do
governments in liberal democracies with weak courts restrain themselves from
suppressing political opposition, and why do government in liberal democracies with
strong courts restrain themselves from undermining the courts so that they can suppress
political opposition?
The better answer is that a government that depends on the consent of the public
cannot take the risk of allowing the public to think that the government eliminates
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political opponents who enjoy the support of at least some of the public. Any particular
criminal defendant may be an ordinary criminal, but he may also be an attractive political
target because he leads or belongs to the opposition party, or he or his activities have
symbolic importance for the opposition party. The public, especially the leaders and
members of the opposition political party, will sometimes not know with confidence
whether the government targets a particular criminal defendant because he has actually
committed crimes or poses a threat to security, or because he poses a mere political (or
partisan) threat to the government or party in power. If the public does not know whether
the government uses its monopoly on power to target political opponents, or believes that
it does, it may withdraw support from the existing government, and look for alternatives.
The reason is that a government that uses force against opponents rather than criminals is
not providing maximum security, and indeed may be pursuing policies that benefit the
government itself or its circle of supporters rather than the public at large.
The problem is one of asymmetric information, and the historic solution in
Western states is liberal legalism. There are two points, here. First, liberalism forbids the
illegalization of political opposition, and its manifestation as formal law is freedom of
speech, freedom of association, and the other basic political rights. A government that
voluntary consents to laws that protect opposition parties has taken the first step toward
showing that it is a government that serves the public interest, a government that will
maintain its power not by intimidating political opponents, but by creating good policy
that pleases the public, which will reward the government by returning it to power.
Second, legalism ensures that the government will not circumvent the basic
political rights through subterfuge. The judicial process forces the government to show
that the defendant is an actual criminal or public threat, and not just a political opponent.
The government must show that the defendant has violated a law, that is, a rule with
democratic credentials. The government must persuade an independent judge and jury
that the defendant violated the law. Rules of evidence and publicity ensure that the public
can evaluate the government’s case. Legalism prevents the typical subterfuge by which a
government targets a political opponent not by eliminating him or outlawing his party but
by accusing him of committing a crime that he did not commit, or a crime that is not
generally enforced.
25

None of this suggests that a government will always adopt liberal legalism, or that
liberal legalism is necessarily self-perpetuating. If a government believes that its political
opponents are powerful, and likely to win the next election, the government might think
that it has little to lose by prosecuting them. In unstable democracies, this is a common
occurrence. In the United States, this occurred only once—and while it was still an
unstable quasi-democracy—during the Sedition Act trials of the late eighteenth century,
when Federalists used the judicial process to fend off political attacks by Republican
newspapers.56 In stable democracies, the reason that such trials do not occur more often
than they do is that the reputational cost is so high: a government that prosecutes its
political opponents will lose public support. Indeed, in the U.S., the Sedition Act
prosecutions backfired, made martyrs of Republic writers and editors, and contributed to
the defeat of the Federalists. The experiment would not be repeated.57
In sum, governments grant judicial process and refrain from banning political
opposition as a way of showing that their policies are in the public interest. When this
kind of self-restraint becomes entrenched in a society, we say that the state is both liberal
and legalistic. A government that goes to the trouble of eliminating its political opponents
does so only because it fears that these opponents are likely to attract followers, which
can be the case only if a large segment of the public can be persuaded that the
government’s policies do not benefit it or are otherwise wrong or unjust. If this is the
case, the elimination of political opponents—however attractive for narrow political
reasons—is likely to give rise to the inference that the government’s policies are bad, and
thus result in a loss of political support.
This theory is not incompatible with the philosophical view that political rights
and judicial process are necessary because of fairness or the need to show respect for
human dignity. Indeed, the instrumental theory of liberal legalism shows why a powermaximizing government will adopt liberal policies that many people find attractive on
normative grounds. It thus shows why liberal legalism is politically robust, why

56

Smith, supra.
Id., at 431. Smith provides specific examples that show that defendants convicted of Sedition Act
violations often became heroes; in one case, the defendant was an elected official who was rewarded with
reelection after he was released from prison. See, e.g., id. at 238, 241, 244, 274, 395.

57

26

governments sometimes voluntary introduce liberal reforms, and why liberal legalism can
be attractive to governments in societies (such as Japan) that do not have a long liberal
tradition but instead emphasize the collective good. The theory also shows why liberal
legalism faces limits, the subject of the next section.
C. Departures from Liberal Legalism: Political Trials
If liberal legalism has instrumental value for governments in the way that I have
described, then governments will be tempted to depart from liberal legalism under two
conditions. First, the government faces an unusually dangerous threat that cannot be
adequately addressed within the existing legal framework. Second, the government
enjoys an unusually high level of trust among citizens, so that it need not worry too much
about creating suspicions by denying process in selected cases.
As to the first point, a government knows that if it cannot protect the people, they
will eventually withdraw support. So its priority is security. Threats to security can be
purely internal but can also be external. The normal internal threat is everyday crime.
Most governments can keep crime at tolerable levels without departing from liberal
legalism. To be sure, the norms of legal liberalism are not rigid, and are relaxed or
tightened incrementally as circumstances warrant. When crime increases as a result of an
exogenous shock—new drugs, new technologies—authorities almost always pass laws or
take actions that depart incrementally from liberal legalism. The drug crisis stemming
from the spread of crack cocaine led to a relaxation of liberal legalism across several
dimensions: (i) vague laws that enabled prosecutors to target the most dangerous
criminals; (ii) broad complicity rules that enabled prosecutors to reach all members of a
drug gang; and (iii) anti-association laws that enabled police to prevent congregation of
gang members on the street.58 But the more significant test of liberal legalism is terrorism
or domestic insurgency, and here most liberal states have departed much farther from
liberal legalism, usually for the duration of the crisis, by claiming broad powers to be
exercised only against the terrorist threat.
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Even more important is the external threat. During wartime, virtually all legal
protections may be suspended and military rule imposed, depending on the extent of the
threat. In the United States, the Civil War resulted in the suspension of habeas corpus;
World War I in aggressive sedition laws; and World War II in martial law in Hawaii and
the relocation of Americans of Japanese ancestry on the mainland.59 Soviet led
international communism furnished ample reason, in the minds of American authorities,
for relaxing liberal legalism in the 1920s and again in the 1950s. Today, Islamic terrorism
is the chief external threat to American security, and the excuse for relaxing process
protections.
As to the second point, when people believe that the government does not seek to
eliminate its opponents, they are more likely to tolerate reductions in process. The reason
is that although reducing process may enhance error, it will not disadvantage opponents
or entrench the existing authorities. One common method that governments use to
enhance trust during emergencies is to invite political opponents into the government
itself. Parliamentary systems often produce war cabinets with representatives from the
party that is out of power. In the United States, the most famous example is the
participation of the Republicans Stimson and Knox in Roosevelt’s cabinet during World
War II. Members of the opposition political party with knowledge of the internal
workings of the government can be expected to raise a fuss if they discover the
government is using its emergency powers to persecute their colleagues and supporters.60
Let me put the argument in a more stylized form. Suppose that the possible
defendant in a criminal trial—aside from ordinary criminals—may be either a “public
threat” or a “political opponent” of the government. A public threat is a person such as a
terrorist who is likely to harm the general public or the constitutional system; a political
opponent is a person who poses a threat to an existing government but not to the public—
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the case of normal political opposition. Because the public threat has not committed any
crime, she cannot be convicted of a crime if given normal, that is, “high,” process.
Assume that she can be convicted if given “low” process.
The dilemma faced by the government is that if it uses high process, then people
who are public threats, or are suspected of being public threats, are acquitted and set free;
they engage in terrorist attacks or support subversion; and the public reacts by saying to
the government, “if you cannot protect us, we’ll find another [less scrupulous]
government that will.” The government might, with the acquiescence of the courts,61
rationally grant a low amount of process in response so that it can convict more public
threats. At the same time, the government knows that if it uses low process, the public
will begin to suspect that the government may be targeting political opponents. And as
long as the public assumes that the government is using low process in order to eliminate
political opponents, the government has nothing to lose and much to gain from actually
doing so.62 Still, the public might rationally tolerate low process if the public threat is
serious enough, that is, if it is willing to give government a free hand to defeat the public
threat even if the government will use the same powers to weaken its political opposition.
If the government goes too far, however, it risks a withdrawal of public support.
There may be other ways for government to finesse these difficulties. Instead of
granting low process to all criminal defendants, it can offer high process to “ordinary”
criminals and low process to a class of people whom the public believes more likely to
pose a real threat. The American government, in fact, has done this quite frequently,
granting lower process to aliens, people who openly identify themselves with extremist
groups (Communists, Islamic fundamentalists), and enemy soldiers.63 These people may
also be subject to greater surveillance than ordinary citizens are. The government can also
grant higher than normal process to people who belong to mainstream opposition parties;
this helps avoid the inference that the government’s motives are narrowly political.
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To summarize the argument thus far, we can imagine the following sequence of
events. First, some emergency or apparent emergency occurs, and the public demands
protection against the real or imaginary threat. Second, the government responds by
reducing procedural protections. At one extreme, it might suspend habeas corpus and
declare martial law. But the reduction of procedural protections can take subtler forms:
the enactment of new laws, or the invocation of long dormant laws, that target seditious,
disloyal, or dangerous behavior; reliance on newly broad interpretations of existing laws
so that they may be used against the perceived threats; refusal by judges and juries to give
certain types of defendants the benefit of the doubt; relaxed evidentiary standards;
restrictions on defense lawyers’ access to their clients. Third, the government now has
greater freedom of action, which it can use against political opponents as well as the
people who pose the new public threat. A rational, power-maximizing government will
use its freedom of action to pursue both types of person. Fourth, the public realizes that
the government can use its freedom of action against partisan opponents as well as public
threats. The public may partially or fully withdraw support from the government because
it fears political persecution of marginal or even mainstream political opponents of the
government; but it also may accept this reduction in political competition as an
acceptable price to pay for enhanced security. Defendants in criminal trials will exploit
this public unease, and claim to be political opponents (when such a claim is plausible)
whether or not they in fact are. Critics of the government will call these trials “political
trials.”
At this point, it might be useful to return to the definition of the political trial.
“Political trial” is usually used as an epithet, and so it is tempting to stipulate that a trial is
political only if the government uses its freedom of action to target political opponents
rather than genuine political threats. Partisan trials are almost always objectionable
because they violate the principle of political competition at the heart of liberal
democracy. We could adopt this narrow definition of political trial; but then we would
need a word for criminal trials of defendants who are not mere political opponents but in
fact public threats—threats to the entire constitutional system or to the well being of
many people—who have not committed ordinary crimes. The better approach is to use a
broad definition of political trial, a definition that encompasses both the partisan trial of
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political opponents, and the more public-spirited trial of public threats. The reason is that
the latter type of trial violates the rule of law: it is political, not legal, albeit political in
the broader, less objectionable sense—a matter of (possibly wise) policy rather than a
vindication of the law. A further reason for using the broad definition is that most
relevant trials fall between the two extremes: the anarchist, Communist, or Islamic
terrorist are both political opponents in the narrow sense, and also threats (even if remote
and long-term) to the constitutional system. And the final and decisive reason for using
the broad definition is that the political trial (in the broad sense) provides institutional
design challenges that the ordinary criminal trial does not. For example, a judge who
presides over political trials might appropriately change the rules of process in order to
interfere with partisan prosecutions while permitting convictions of public threats.
Political trials can be contrasted to show trials. Show trials were conducted by
Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, and by many Soviet satellites. Defendants were
tortured or threatened off stage, then at trial would confess to whatever crimes the
government charged them with, so as to avoid being tortured or shot afterwards, and to
spare their families the same fate. The defendants were, in effect, unpaid actors in a
propaganda film. Show trials cut the Gordian knot: governments eliminate partisan
opponents as well as public threats without losing public support through the simple
expedient of pretending that they grant process protections when they are doing nothing
of the sort. If the public believes the government, its problems are solved.64 But the
pretense cannot be maintained indefinitely even in an authoritarian state, and show trials
usually stop after a few years. Show trials are not an option in an open society because
they would require the collaboration of people with different political views and goals—
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prosecutors, judges, lawyers, juries—or else the wholesale destruction of existing
institutions which itself would alert people of the government’s intentions.65
D. Summary, Evidence, Implications
Liberal legalism is an instrumental strategy used by governments to maximize
political support in societies that have a general interest in security but tolerate normal
political opposition. Liberal legalism enables the government to minimize internal threats
to public security to the largest extent possible, consistent with the need to reassure the
public that it will not maintain its power by harassing political opponents. When security
threats increase, governments depart incrementally from liberal legalism because the
public now is willing to tolerate a marginal increase in the harassment of (usually
extreme) political opponents in return for greater security. As a result, political trials
occur. These trials will target both authentic public threats and partisan political
opponents. If the gain in security is large enough that the public as a whole benefits even
though the government itself can increasingly use political trials to enhance its own
power, then erosion of liberal legalism is likely to be tolerated, at least for the duration of
the emergency.66
The history of political trials in the United States supports the thesis that in a
liberal democracy, political trials are more likely to be (politically) successful when
defendants are extremists than when they are mainstream opponents. The Sedition Act
trials of Jeffersonian Republicans were a spectacular failure: rather than destroy the
Republicans, they destroyed the Federalists. Another example is the failed impeachment
of U.S. Supreme Court Justice Chase in 1805, this time at the instigation of Republicans,
against a Federalist justice.67 These failures helped establish the legitimacy of political
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competition between mainstream parties in the United States:68 the implicit bargain—that
the judicial process will not be used against mainstream partisan opponents—has held,
more or less, for 200 years.
Subsequent political trials can be divided in two categories. First, there were trials
of people who had virtually no mainstream political support: anarchists, Nazi
sympathizers and Communists. Although the trials of these people often took place in a
circus-like atmosphere, the evidence suggests that the public approved of the trials and
convictions, and that the political standing of the government improved as a result of
them.69 Second, there were trials of people whose views were somewhere between
moderate and extreme: opponents of the Civil War, World War I, and the Vietnam Wars.
These trials were only moderately successful, as one might expect. Civil War-era military
trials of dissenters may have maintained order but were highly controversial and
politically damaging.70 World War I-era espionage and sedition prosecutions were
popular and may have helped the war effort, but they also enhanced the prestige of
radical politicians like Eugene Debs.71 Vietnam War-era prosecutions like the Chicago 8
trial seem both to have discouraged violent protests and to have weakened support for the
national government and its policies.72
The refusal to use political trials as a routine weapon against political opponents,
reserving its use for serious public threats, can evolve in a decentralized fashion, and
need not be imposed by third parties such as courts. The history of Britain supports this
considered a part of the mainstream opposition; Justice Marshall, however, who derailed the trial by
defining “treason” narrowly, was. But see Robert K. Faulkner, Justice Marshall and the Burr Trial, 53 J.
Legal History 247 (1966) (criticizing the view that Marshall’s interpretation of treason law showed political
bias).
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proposition, as does self-restraint in the use of the impeachment power in the United
States,73 and for that matter the self-restraint of executive branch officials even when
there has been short-term public support for political trials. However, in the United States
the judiciary has a great deal prestige, and it can interfere with political trials that the
government is inclined to pursue. Thus, it is useful today to take the perspective of the
judge, and ask how a judge should manage a criminal trial that is, or might be, motivated
by the political goals of the government.
III. Design Principles
A political trial trades off two values: the value of convicting a defendant who
poses a risk to the government or public and the value of maintaining the public’s
confidence that the government does not target political opponents. Ordinary judicial
process, involving relatively specific laws that prohibit harmful behavior, reflects the
weight of the second value. The question raised by the political trial is whether process
should be relaxed (or enhanced), and in what ways. This question is one of design and
management.
A. Laws Against Political Opposition
The most easily recognizable political trial is an ordinary trial for violation of a
law that prohibits political opposition to the government. Authoritarian states have often
enacted such laws. The law might prohibit the formation of political parties aside from
the ruling party; any kind of political activity that opposes the government; subversive
activity; advocacy of policies that are contrary to government policies; and so forth. A
trial in which all the forms of legality are respected would nonetheless result in the
conviction of a defendant because of his political views or activities.
Liberal democracies do not have laws prohibiting mainstream political
opposition: tolerance of formal political opposition is the key distinction between the
liberal democratic system and the authoritarian system. But the amount of tolerance is not
absolute. Turkey—whose democratic credentials are solid but not perfect—bans
fundamentalist Islamic parties. Germany prohibits parties that oppose its constitutional

73

See Hoffer and Hull, supra (discussing early state and federal impeachments in the United States).

34

system.74 Other democracies have similar bans on extremist parties and subversive
activities that are counter to the constitutional order.75 Thus, they make a distinction
between mainstream political dissent, which is tolerated, and constitutional dissent,
which is not tolerated.
In the United States, there have been four overt attempts to suppress political
dissent. The Sedition Act of 1798 prohibited “false, scandalous and malicious”
statements about the government, but it was interpreted broadly so that it could be used to
prosecute mainstream Republican opponents of the Adams administration. That statute
expired in 1801. Martial law during the Civil War permitted the military to try and punish
people who criticized the Lincoln administration’s conduct of the war.76 The Espionage
and Sedition Acts of 1917-1918 were directed against obstruction of recruitment and
interference with the military, but it was broadly interpreted to prohibit criticism of
American participation in World War I. The Smith Act of 1940 prohibited advocacy of
violent revolution of the government, and was also interpreted broadly until 1957.77 The
Internal Security Act of 1950 and the Communist Control Act of 1954 “effectively
criminalized the Communist party.”78 Of these cases, only the Sedition Act of 1798 was,
as interpreted by judges, a clear effort to suppress dissent by a mainstream group. The
Espionage and Sedition Acts and the Smith Act targeted extremists, although these
extremists did include prominent people (such as Eugene Debs) who had large
followings. The Civil War case is ambiguous.
Why would a government prosecute members of fringe parties or people with
idiosyncratic political beliefs? By assumption, these people do not pose a threat, or much
of a threat, to the political dominance of the government. One reason is that such people
may be dangerous to the public. The U.S. government prosecuted Communists not
because they posed an electoral threat, but because they were loyal to America’s enemy,
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the Soviet Union.79 The U.S. government currently pursues al Qaeda sympathizers
because an al Qaeda sympathizer might provide money, shelter, or other support to actual
terrorists. If the evidence of criminal behavior is not strong, the government moves
against these people based on an assessment of the risks. A Communist ideologue might
be a spy, or know a spy.80 An al Qaeda sympathizer—especially one with a great deal of
wealth and ties to fundamentalist Islamic groups—is a risk even if he has not committed
a crime, or cannot be proven, given the standards of criminal law, to have committed a
crime. Such a sympathizer may also demoralize the public by cheering on terrorist
attacks, and create an atmosphere of insecurity. Thus, people with extreme
antigovernment beliefs are more likely to be public threats than people without such
beliefs—even ordinary criminals—and for this reason governments may seek to
prosecute them.
To prosecute such people without violating due process, the government would
need to rely on laws that directly prohibited such activity. As we have seen, there are, and
have been, many such laws—against subversion, conspiracy to violate the law, and the
like—but these laws have proven to be unpopular. The problem with criminalizing
membership in a particular organization like the American Communist Party is that
members can easily evade the law by disbanding the proscribed organization and setting
up a new one. If broader laws are used, and all seditious organizations or activities are
prohibited, then mainstream organizations can too easily be swept within their net, a
possibility that inevitably provokes widespread political opposition—and understandably,
as the government may find itself unable to resist the temptation to enforce the laws
against mainstream political opponents.81
If a government cannot enact laws against political opposition, then it will find
itself hampered in its efforts to prosecute public threats who have not engaged in clearly
illegal or violent acts. Its best hope is to bring charges under a general law against
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disorderly or subversive behavior,82 or even unrelated laws against, say, wire fraud or
extortion,83 and then persuade the judge to acquiesce in restrictions on process. These
restrictions are the hallmark of political trials in liberal democracies and the focus of the
next several sections.
B. Charges, Defense, and Evidence
Legalism requires that defendants be charged with the violation of an existing
law; that defendants be informed of the charges against them, so that they may prepare a
defense; and that defendants be given access to evidence, so that they may prove their
case.
All of these elements of normal process interfere with the prosecution of public
threats. If the government does not have laws against political or ideological opposition,
then it will not be able to apply generally applicable rules against criminal behavior to
people who have not yet caused a harm or who are not on the verge of doing so. If the
government must candidly inform the defendant that it has no legal case against him, then
he will be able to make a plausible argument that the trial is political. And the
government may not be able to reveal evidence that the defendant is a public threat
without compromising intelligence assets and revealing information that will harm
security. In the Rosenberg case, for example, some of the government’s evidence came
from secret cable intercepts that, if revealed, would have permitted the Soviet Union to
destroy valuable intelligence assets.84 The problem for the government is that if it denies
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process—say, it tries the defendant in secret in order to determine whether he is a public
threat or not—then it risks losing its credibility.
The government reduces these tensions in several ways.
Selective prosecution. First, the government prosecutes public threats, when
possible, for violating generally applicable laws—laws against conspiracy, disorderly
conduct, subversion, trespass, incitement to riot, and so forth—that are not usually
enforced against ordinary people who do the things that the actual defendant did. This
approach is very much a compromise. On the one hand, the public will be suspicious of
the government because selective prosecution can be used against political opponents. On
the other hand, the harm to the government’s reputation is mitigated by the fact that the
generally applicable laws have received public approval, and political opponents can
maintain their freedom by complying with these laws. There may be a special hardship in
complying with nanny taxes, sodomy laws, and conspiracy laws that no one else pays
attention to, but that is not as bad as prosecution that is unconstrained by the law. In
addition, general laws often have lower sentences, precisely because they can be applied
against so many people; so the corresponding risk to political opposition is lessened.
Consider the following examples. Discussing the trial of Leroi Jones in 1967, one
scholar notes that “it was uncertain whether Jones was on trial for a stated or implied
charge—for having possessed [two revolvers], or for having been responsible, in some
mysterious way, for the riots that had engulfed Newark.”85 The Chicago 8 were tried for
conspiracy to incite riots but the real motivation was to suppress the defendants’ vigorous
and effective opposition to government policy and to make an example of them. The East
German head of intelligence—to take an example from a transitional trial—was tried for
a murder he committed sixty years earlier; his real crime was his leadership of East
German intelligence.86 At Nuremberg, the prosecutors hit upon the fiction of the
criminality of certain Nazi organizations such as the SS, so that all members including (in
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principle) janitors and secretaries, could be held guilty for the crimes directed by the
leaders of the organization.87
An extreme example comes from the Haymarket trial. The defendants had
advocated violent revolution, but no evidence linked them to the bomb-thrower (never
caught) who killed the police officers. The judge instructed the jury that the defendants
could be convicted if they “by print or speech advised, or encouraged the commission of
murder, without designating time, place or occasion at which it should be done….”88 The
government sought to disrupt the anarchist movement, and the murder became the
occasion for eliminating several of its leaders, and of frightening its members.
Governments can rarely be completely candid in political trials because they do
not want to admit that the trial violates due process even if the violation is justified for
reasons of public security. Instead, governments accuse the defendant of violating a
general law, while also arguing that the acute danger posed by the defendant justifies a
harsh sentence. Defendants might complain that if they do not know the real reason that
the government is prosecuting them, they cannot mount an effective defense. LeRoi Jones
could argue that he cannot defend himself if he thinks the government is prosecuting him
for gun possession when in fact the judge and jury will convict him if they think he
caused the Newark riots. I will say more about this concern below.
Partial sharing of evidence. Second, the government may be willing to reveal
classified evidence to the judge or the defense lawyer as long as it is not shared with the
defendant. The defendant can legitimately object that he will not be able to mount a
sufficient defense without having access to the information; he may not be able to reveal
relevant mitigating evidence to his lawyer or the judge unless he knows about the
apparently inculpatory evidence that is classified.
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There are various intermediate strategies. In some current prosecutions of Islamic
terrorists, for example, the government shares the evidence with defense lawyers on the
condition that they do not reveal it to the defendant.
The upshot is that the government gains the power to use classified evidence but
also incites the distrust of the public, who might believe that the evidence is not
inculpatory and the defendant is merely a political opponent. The solution is to shift the
burden to the judge (and/or defense lawyer) in the hope that the public will believe that
the judge will evaluate the evidence impartially and can evaluate it correctly without
hearing the response of the defendant. The solution can be effective—in the sense of
maintaining the government’s credibility while allowing it to convict the defendant—
only if the public believes that the judge is impartial and the defendant’s inability to
respond the evidence does not undermine his ability to defend himself. But then the
question is, why should the public trust the judge? We return to this question in Part
III.C.
Political defenses. Third, the court, with or without the government’s
acquiescence, may allow the defendant to mount a political defense. Ordinary criminal
defendants are rarely permitted to argue that their crimes were justified because the
government is evil. There is no reason for an ordinary criminal trial to become a forum
for evaluating the government’s policies. But when the public suspects that the defendant
is being prosecuted for his political views, it may make sense to allow the defendant to
mount a political defense. If his views are extreme—for example, he is an anarchist who
thinks that terrorism is justified—then the public will be more likely to support the
prosecution. If his views are moderate, then it will be more likely that the government’s
motives are partisan. Thus, by allowing defendants to make political statements,
governments may be able to show that a prosecution is appropriately directed toward a
public threat rather than motivated by partisanship.
The judge in the Debs case permitted the defendant to make a speech defending
his actions—opposition to American participation in World War I—on political
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grounds.89 The judge in the Dennis case prevented the defendants from arguing that the
Communist Party had an appealing political program and limited them to the question
whether the party had ever advocated violent revolution.90 Both trials were successes for
the government and the judge, though the Debs trial was far less disruptive even though
he was a more politically popular figure.
The problem with allowing defendants to mount a political defense is that they
may persuade the public to take their side; and, even if they do not, they may be able to
undermine the public’s confidence in the justice system by converting the trial into
theater, preferably farce. Mockery of the judge, disruption, grandstanding, and delay
become the defendant’s most powerful tools. Disruption provokes the judge to take harsh
measures against the defendants which further show that the judge is complicit in the
government’s effort to suppress political dissent.
This strategy succeeded spectacularly in the trial of Elizabeth Dilling and her
codefendants—a group of Nazi sympathizers prosecuted under the Smith Act during
World War II—whose lawyers objected to every act of the prosecutor and disputed every
ruling of the judge. The trial dragged on for months and then ended abruptly with the
death of the trial judge—from exhaustion, it is said. A retrial more than a year later was
dismissed.91
To deal with these problems, judges need great skill and patience. The judges in
the trial of Edward Dennis and other members of the American communist party in 1949,
and in the trial of the Chicago 8 in 1969, were considerably less tolerant of courtroom
theatrics than the Dilling judge was. The Dennis judge frequently cut off the defendants
and their lawyers. The Chicago 8 judge jailed defendants and their lawyers for contempt.
In taking these steps, the judges opened themselves up to the accusation that they were
depriving the defendants of a fair trial. Numerous rulings of the Chicago 8 judge were
reversed on appeal. Although both judges survived the ordeal,92 the Dennis judge was far
more successful; and the reason was almost surely that Dennis was a less sympathetic
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figure at the time, than the Chicago 8 defendants were. America was unified in its
opposition to the Soviet Union, and therefore Dennis was unpopular except among fringe
groups; America was divided over Vietnam, and thus the Chicago 8 defendants, although
politically extreme, enjoyed some mainstream support for their stand against American
militarism.
In international criminal trials, these tensions are even more acute. The
Nuremberg charter prohibited defendants from making the “tu quoque” defense that their
behavior was no different from that of their enemies. As a result, it was no defense for the
Nazis that their crimes of aggressive war were matched by those of the Soviet Union,
which invaded Poland, the Baltic states, and Finland.93 These prohibitions were only
partially successful. As always, they raised the specter of victor’s justice, and in any
event did not prevent many Nuremberg defendants from drawing the world’s attention to
the misdeeds of the allies.94
To prevent them from doing so, the American prosecutor, Robert Jackson, had
requested that defendants under cross-examination be limited to yes/no answers. The
judges refused, and as a result Goering was able to best Jackson in the cross-examination,
humiliating Jackson and providing a tonic for the defense. Tusa and Tusa argue that
nonetheless “those [defense lawyers] who wanted to continue to complain about the
unfairness of the proceedings now did so with less chance of winning sympathy.”95 One
might instead say that the prosecutors’ arguments would more likely persuade the world
if the defendants had an adequate chance to refute them and failed, than if the defendants
did not have the chance to refute them. Jackson’s request betrayed the fear that the world
would not be persuaded if the defendants had the opportunity to explain themselves
during cross-examination, in which case muzzling them might have been the right
strategy, albeit at the risk of creating a show trial.
The Yugoslavia tribunal has had even more trouble with political defenses.
Milosevic and other defendants have used the trials to rally support for their causes at
home, and to cast aspersions on the motives of the judges and the international
93

See Marrus, supra, at 131-32.
Marrus, supra, at 116-17.
95
Tusa and Tusa, supra, at 291-92.
94

42

community, which they accuse of exhibiting bias against Serbia. Milosevic’s trial may
take as long as five years.96 The trials have been blamed for a resurgence of nationalism
in Serbia after a period of optimism that Serbia would become a normal liberal
democracy or a reasonable approximation of one.97
Judges can interrupt defendants who do not follow the rules, and hold defenses
out of order, but the defendants can complain of this, and so jurors and other witnesses
might conclude that the government’s motives are partisan, the judge is complicit, and
the defendants are political opponents rather than public threats. Thus, like the other
devices we have discussed, limiting the defense can have ambiguous effects. It can
increase the probability of convicting a public threat by depriving the defendant of a
defense, but it can also cause the jury to acquit the defendant, or the public to withdraw
support from the government, because they suspect that the defendant is merely a
political opponent.
C. The Judge
Judges are supposed to be impartial: they enforce the rules without bias toward
the prosecution or the defense. For ordinary criminal trials, the ideal of the impartial
judge is attainable because judges, whatever their hostility toward criminals, can enforce
the rules of due process and ensure that people likely to have committed crimes are
locked up in jail. Generally applicable criminal laws are uncontroversial; the judges can
enforce those laws; and the ordinary rules of process function mainly to ensure that
innocent people are not inadvertently convicted.
Normal process no long functions smoothly when the defendant is a public threat
who has not committed any crime. If no law against political dissent or opposition exists,
then the judge can ensure conviction of the public threat only by relaxing the rule of law.
In this way, the judge must be complicit in the government’s effort to selectively apply
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vague, general laws against particular defendants, or even in the trumping up of charges
when no such laws can be used.
This leads to our familiar dilemma. If judges relax process when they think that a
defendant is a public threat, then governments may take advantage of this opportunity
and bring charges against partisan opponents. Eventually, the public, including the
mainstream opposition, will realize that process protections have been relaxed, and the
government will lose its credibility. If people believe that the government targets its
political opponents by persuading judges that they are public threats, they will—on the
theory I have advanced—withdraw their support from the government. They would likely
withdraw their trust from the judiciary as well.
Several design features of the judiciary mitigate this tension. I divide them into
two categories: selection of judges and incentives of judges
Selection of judges. In the United States, virtually every judge is a member of one
of the two major political parties, and is selected on the basis of two criteria: competence
and proved partisan loyalty. In most other advanced countries, judges are members of the
government bureaucracy but are trained as, and treated as, experts rather than partisans.
The American system functions properly as long as the parties alternate in power
and/or government is occasionally divided, so that judicial appointments are, individually
or in the aggregate, the product of compromise between the two parties.98 As most judges
are the product of the patronage system, they will refuse to allow the other party in power
to convict members of their own party on trumped up charges. To be sure, frequently a
(say) Republican government will be able to bring a case before a Republican judge, but
then there is the chance that the appellate panel will be dominated by Democrats, who
will be sure to draw attention to partisan elements in the trial if there are any. By contrast,
neither a Republican judge nor a Democratic judge will have much sympathy for a
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radical who seeks to destroy the constitutional system under which the judges exercise
power. Thus, they are more likely to relax the rules of process in such cases.
The selection system in foreign countries is not quite as effective. Judges are
trained as technocrats, and therefore they are more likely than their American
counterparts to apply process rules in a mechanical fashion, regardless of the political
views of the defendant. This may explain why legislatures in some of these countries—
especially, Germany—are more likely to pass laws that prohibit extreme political dissent
inconsistent with the constitutional underpinnings of the state.
Incentives of judges. But the civil law systems make up for the weak selection
mechanism with more powerful incentives. Judges are bureaucrats, and while they have
some civil service protections, they are vulnerable to sanctions meted out by the
government. In Japan, for example, judges who displease the government may find them
assigned to remote, rural districts.99 To avoid such sanctions, judges may be willing to
relax process rules when the defendant is a public threat.
But then why wouldn’t such judges also permit convictions of partisan
opponents? The answer is likely that the judges must fear that the mainstream opposition
party of today will be the party in power tomorrow, and then armed with the power to
exile the judge to remote districts or show their displeasure in other ways. Thus, the
alternation of parties maintains an incentive to enable the prosecution of people whom
both parties dislike—genuine public threats—and not the prosecution of people whom
only one party dislikes, namely, members of another mainstream party.
By contrast, it is harder for the American government to punish judges who fail to
relax process in trials of public threats. Federal judges have independence under the
constitution, which, as a practical matter, makes punishment impossible. Still, the
government can reward compliant judges by elevating them. Indeed, the judges in the
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Rosenberg and Dennis cases were elevated to the court of appeals.100 Judge Hand, who
ruled against the government in an espionage act case during World War I, was
subsequently denied elevation to the courts of appeals that may have been his due.101
As a practical matter, then, the American and foreign systems have the same
effect. They either select judges, or give them incentives, such that process rules are
likely to be maintained for trials of mainstream partisan political opponents, but not for
trials of public threats or people with fringe views. Judges might expect to be rewarded
when they conduct trials that lead to convictions of people who are widely regarded as
public threats—either with popular acclaim or elevation or similar benefits. In the first
week after the Dennis case concluded, the presiding judge received 50,000 letters from
grateful citizens, who urged him to run for office.102 And, of course, judges may share the
public’s fear of public threats, and be willing to relax process rules in order to convict
them.
How judges relax process. How do judges relax process without destroying the
rule of law as a device for maintaining political peace between mainstream groups? The
key has been to relax process only for extremists, and only during times of emergency.
As to the first point, there are only two historical episodes in American history
when mainstream political opponents were prosecuted. The first episode involved the
prosecutions under the Sedition Act of Jeffersonian opponents of the Federalists. These
prosecutions were extremely unpopular, and contributed to the massive electoral defeat of
the Federalists in 1800, and their elimination as a viable political party.103 Consistent with
my thesis, the Federalists only made themselves more unpopular—less trustworthy for
most voters—by prosecuting their political opponents.
The second episode was the Civil War, when military rule enabled authorities in
the North to prosecute people who expressed political sympathy with the Confederacy.
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These trials sometimes led to significant political disturbances in the North, and Lincoln,
who was more politically sophisticated than the generals to whom he had to delegate
military rule, was not happy with them.104 However, to avoid the obstructionist efforts of
mainstream judges like Justice Taney,105 Lincoln had to rely on military rule, and with it
the attendant risks.
Since then, there have been no American political trials against mainstream
political opponents. All political trials have targeted extremists—Communists and
anarchists, Nazis, KKK members, members of Islamic fundamentalist groups. When the
government prosecutes extremists, we are not as likely to assume that it is trying to obtain
partisan advantage—these extremists are just too weak and unpopular, and are feared
because of their tendency toward violence—except, of course, when the prosecution
takes advantage of public fears or misunderstandings for political gain (no different from
ordinary prosecutions for political gain).
This is not to say that trials of extremists have been uncontroversial. Political
views fall along the spectrum, and trials against extremists make people nervous who are
between the extreme and the mainstream. But the point, for now, is that American judges
have allowed these trials to proceed, and they have been politically possible and even
advantageous.
Indeed, some judges have enthusiastically facilitated political prosecutions. The
Federalist judges in the Sedition Act cases instructed juries in such a way that shifted
much of the burden of proof onto the defendants.106 Most judges in Espionage Act cases
during World War I read the statute broadly, so that the government would not need to
provide evidence that the defendant’s statement caused a direct harm such as obstruction
of military recruitment.107 The judge in the Haymarket case allowed the bailiff to stack
the jury with middle class, mostly native born citizens hostile to the anarchist, workingclass, foreign born defendants; and gave the prosecution much more latitude than the
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defense.108 The judge in the Chicago 8 case jailed many of the defendants and their
lawyers for contempt, errors that were reversed on appeal.109 The judge in the LeRoi
Jones case made clear, by his questioning and demeanor, that he believed that Jones was
guilty.110
An abiding concern for judges is that if they identify too closely with the
government, they will lose their reputation for impartiality. If they are not considered
impartial, or at least as some sort of constraint on the government, they will both lose
much of their public support and also the support of the government itself, which can
benefit from judges who constrain it somewhat, rather than too much or too little. Judges
preserve their integrity while allowing governments leeway in two main ways.
First, judges relax process mainly during wartime and other emergencies.111 In
doing so, they ensure that normal political competition will occur during normal times, at
which time judges will enforce normal process protections. This is not altogether
satisfactory, however, because the government can use emergencies, or pretextual
emergencies, as opportunities to consolidate power. In addition, if judges are seen as
toadies of the government during an emergency, they may not be able to shake off this
reputation during normal times.
Second, judges encourage governments to create specialized courts that are not
operated by regular (Article III) judges. Military courts and commissions are examples;
notice that these tribunals do not eschew process altogether but reduce it. Military judges
and lawyers are loyal to the military, but are expected to act with some independence and
can be trusted to keep secrets. 112 Allowing the government to use the military does not
protect partisan opponents, but it does preserve the integrity of the judiciary (except to
the extent that permitting military trials undermines it), so that it can credibly reassert its
impartiality as between the mainstream parties when the emergency ends.

108

See Avrich, supra at 262-67.
Id., at 78.
110
See Dolbeare and Grossman, supra, at 232-34.
111
Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Accommodating Emergencies, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 605 (2003).
112
For the Supreme Court’s views of the tradeoffs involved, see Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 77879 (1950) (upholding conviction by military tribunal of nonresident enemy aliens).
109

48

We have seen these two factors at work in the Bush administration’s creation of
military commissions to try al Qaeda members and Taliban soldiers. The establishment of
these commissions has not hurt the government politically113 because the public appears
to believe that emergency conditions justify a relaxation of due process and, at the
present time, it is not plausible to think that these commissions are being used against
mainstream partisan opponents.
D. The Jury
Scholars today usually think of juries as fact-gathering institutions. Because jurors
bring diverse experiences and expectations to the trial, they can combine their
perspectives, enabling them to sift evidence more effectively than even a highly
experienced judge. The assumption that juries are necessary for accuracy has stimulated a
large literature that investigates the extent to which jurors really do make correct
decisions about guilt and innocence. Although this literature has not come to firm
conclusions, evidence suggests that cognitive biases and social influences may cause
jurors to make worse decisions than judges do.114
This scholarly focus has obscured another function of juries, which is not so much
to contribute to the accuracy of the fact gathering process as to present a barrier against
government oppression with judicial connivance. The jury’s entrenchment in American
jurisprudence is due to its success prior to the revolution, when jury nullification derailed
prosecutions of revolutionaries and other critics of the British government. The judges,
who owed their position to British authorities, took the side of the prosecution, and were
frustrated by the recalcitrant juries. This history implanted in the American mind the
conviction that juries, not judges, are the bulwark against political prosecutions.115
The history suggests that the jury could be an ideal device for permitting political
prosecutions against public threats but not against partisan opponents. After the American
revolution, the jury could no longer regard the government as presumptively a hostile
force. And if the government can make a plausible case that a particular defendant poses
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a public threat, the jury may be willing to convict even though the legal basis of the
conviction is weak. In addition, as long as the jury is politically diverse—in the sense of
having at least one or two members who belong to, or sympathize with, the opposition
party—the unanimity rule ensures that partisan convictions will not be possible. To be
sure, extremists who find their ways onto juries may be able to block the conviction of a
public threat, but judges and lawyers are careful to prevent such people from being
assigned to the jury. Thus, as a general matter, juries ought to be able to hinder partisan
prosecutions but not prosecutions of public threats.
American history provides only ambiguous evidence for this hypothesis. Juries
have tended to return convictions, whether the defendant belonged to an extremist or
mainstream group. Thus, although it is true that Wobblies, members of the Communist
Party, and foreign spies have been routinely convicted,116 juries also returned convictions
almost without exception under the Sedition Act of 1798, which targeted mainstream
opponents of the government.117 Juries did not interfere with Sedition Act prosecutions
because jurors were selected by political appointees such as marshals,118 and many of the
judges, at that time, instructed the juries in an aggressive fashion. However, jury
manipulation became a political issue that was exploited by the Republicans.119 And
perhaps the fear of jury nullification explains why there were not more trials in the
Republican dominated south.120
The best evidence for the hypothesis that juries could block political convictions
comes from the indirect case of the Civil War. We cannot directly prove this argument
because highly charged political prosecutions did not occur in front of juries. With the
suspension of habeas corpus and military rule, political opponents could be tried without
a jury or, for that matter, an independent judge. But it seems clear that the reason that
Lincoln and then Congress suspended habeas corpus was that they expected juries to
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acquit Southern sympathizers and others who were conspiring to impede troop
movements or engage in sabotage but who had not committed a provable crime.121
Thus, although juries have not in practice interfered with many political trials, the
costs and visibility of manipulating them in order to ensure that a conviction will be
obtained may prove to be too high for many governments. The more mainstream the
political opponent, the more difficult it will be to manipulate the jury—because it is more
likely that a member of the opponent’s party will end up on the jury unless manipulation
takes place. And even if manipulation is successful, it may be blatant and thus good
fodder for the defense. It might be that there have been fewer partisan trials than there
would have been if there had been no jury right.
E. The Defense Lawyer
Good legal process grants criminal defendants the right to competent and
independent

defense

counsel.

Competence

is

a

straightforward

requirement;

independence is more complex. Defense lawyers are officers of the court, and they are
not permitted to help the defendant engage in perjury. But, even if paid by the
government, they are, as a matter of custom, law, and professional self-understanding,
antagonistic to the prosecution, to the point that obtaining an acquittal of a guilty client
may seem a positive duty and a badge of honor. And, of course, defense lawyers attract
clients by obtaining acquittals.
When the defendant is a public threat, the independence of the defense counsel
may create problems. At one extreme, defense lawyers may belong to groups that share
the terroristic goals of the defendant. If so, revealing classified information to defense
lawyers becomes an unacceptable risk for the government. Even allowing defense
lawyers to have private contact with defendants may pose unacceptable risks, as defense
lawyers may carry messages between defendants and their organizations.122 Even if the
defense lawyer does not share the defendant’s goals, he or she may inadvertently reveal
sensitive information.
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At the other extreme, the defense lawyer’s good faith zeal on behalf of his client
may hinder the prosecution of a public threat. Defense lawyers demand process; if the
government relaxes process, the defense lawyer will draw attention to the government’s
efforts, and cause public embarrassment, and perhaps persuade the jury to acquit. All of
this may be tolerable but far from ideal.
But denying the defendant a lawyer is hardly a solution, as it encourages the
public to think that the government believe that the defendant is being tried because he is
a partisan opponent rather than a criminal or a public threat.
Various intermediate mechanisms have been developed. First, the weakest
constraint is to require defense lawyers to abjure any connection with, or sympathy for,
extremist groups. In the United States, this constraint arose in a decentralized way when
bar associations decided that their members may not belong to the Communist party. 123
Second, governments may replace civilian defense lawyers with military lawyers.
This requires a suspension of habeas corpus, as in the Civil War, or else the classification
of the defendant as an enemy combatant.124 Military procedure does not usually do
without lawyers; but the defense lawyers are soldiers, and therefore can be assumed to be
more loyal to the state than ordinary defense lawyers are.
Third, governments can give more or less assistance to lawyers; more or less
access to their clients; and so forth. In some of the recent enemy combatant cases, the
defendants were initially denied access to a lawyer, and then given limited access under
supervision. At Nuremberg the defense lawyers were drawn from the German bar but had
little time to prepare their cases, compared to the prosecution, which had a head start in
addition to its vast resources.125 The defendants at the Tokyo trial were given American
and British lawyers to assist them, allowing them to mount a more effective defense.126
The problem here, however, was that the American and British lawyers did not
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understand their clients very well, and were not sympathetic to their main goal, which
was to protect the Emperor rather than gain acquittal.127
To the extent that defense lawyers feel loyalty to the government, or have
internalized norms of judicial process—so that they will attack the prosecutor but not the
system—they may have limited value for the political defendant. The American
Communist Party instructed its members not to use lawyers, or to limit them to the
technical aspects of the case, and trained members to use the courtroom as a platform for
espousing their opposition to capitalism. The goal was not to persuade the jury to acquit
the defendant—though that would be welcome—but to persuade workers that the
capitalist justice system could not do justice.128
F. Publicity
Political trials are often public but not always. Publicity serves the cause of the
government when it believes that the defendant is a public threat, and that the public,
persuaded by the prosecution that the defendant is dangerous, will forgive any bending of
the rule of law and feel gratitude to the government for protecting it.
But publicity also protects the defendant, who can use the trial as a platform to
denounce the government. The Chicago 8 trial is the best example of this phenomenon in
recent memory, but there have been many other trials in which the government backed
off and dropped charges or settled after the political danger of the trial became clear; or
pardoned or granted clemency to the defendants. Eugene Debs’ stature rose after his
conviction for sedition during World War I. He received almost one million votes for
president while in jail, and subsequently his sentence was commuted by President Warren
Harding.129
If publicity can protect the political opponent, it can also endanger the prosecution
of the public threat. Many political trials have been against accused spies such as the
Rosenbergs and Alger Hiss, and the government does not want to reveal secret
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information to the world. The usual practice is to keep relatively low level trials secret
when that is permitted by law; military tribunals may be kept secret, for example. But this
creates the risk that the public will infer that the defendants are not public threats but
political rivals of the government.
Political trials are often farcical, and, for many, this shows that they are a bad
idea. At the Chicago 8 trial, the defendants Abbie Hoffman and Jerry Rubin appeared in
court one day wearing judicial robes, and then took them off and wiped their feet on
them.130 At the Dilling trial, defense lawyers repetitiously lodged identical objections on
behalf of each of the defendants in order to delay the trial and frustrate the judge.131 But
the elements of farce are the result of the specific strategy of the defendant to risk
everything to make the government back down, rather than work within the legal process
in the hope of gaining a regular acquittal or reduced sentence. In some cases, like the
Chicago 8 trial, the farce worked in favor of the defendants, who managed to convince
large segments of the public that the justice system or the government was unjust. But, in
other cases, like the Dennis case, the farce left the public unmoved, the strategy failed,
and the movement petered out. As messy as these trials were, it is far from clear that they
were failures, from the perspective of the government.
G. Summary
In political trials, the government and the defendant battle for public opinion. The
government seeks to persuade the public that the defendant is a public threat rather than a
mere political opponent. If this is true, the government’s best strategy is to publicize the
trial and give the defendant ample time to make her political defense (“justice is not
possible without a proletarian/Islamic revolution”). Any defects in process may be
forgiven by the judge, jury, and public, who are glad to see the threat extinguished.
Sophisticated defendants in cases like these, however, will downplay their
revolutionary ardor and draw attention to the defects in process. If, for example, the
government relies on a general law, the defendant will point out that the government
could use the law against mainstream political opponents as well as radicals or
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extremists. If the judge or some jurors belong to the out-of-power party, they may be
persuaded to acquit in order to protect themselves and their party. Moderates in the public
may become suspicious that the government is establishing a precedent with the
extremists before turning its attention to mainstream political opponents. If so, they may
put political pressure on the government to drop the charges.
The government, then, has the task of persuading the judge, jury, and public that
the relaxation of process (or the enforcement of explicit laws against political dissent) is
limited to cases involving authentic public threats; this can be done by limiting the law or
enforcement action to aliens, people with connections to enemy foreign countries or
movements, people with connections to groups that engage in violence, and people with
highly sensitive positions (soldiers, spies, government employees), and granting as much
process as is compatible with the requirements of secrecy and other expedients. I have
also argued that allowing political defenses may be useful.
Complicating matters for the government, the logistical difficulties of running an
ordinary criminal trial become political problems in a political trial. The everyday
compromises of a normal criminal trial—the judge and prosecutor’s influence over the
composition of the jury, reliance on secret evidence or testimony when victims or
informers face retaliation, the need to cut off defendants, witnesses, and lawyers in the
interest of time, the exclusion of morally relevant but legally irrelevant arguments, the
blunders of subpar lawyers and judges—take on heightened significance at a political
trial, where a skeptical public may misinterpret these normal compromises as a special
effort by the government to deprive the defendant of what they think are the standard
protections. When the public is suspicious enough about the government’s motives, then
the government might be well advised to give the defendant heightened process and focus
on convicting the defendant for violations of normal laws (if any) rather than making his
dangerousness the focus of the trial. This may explain why international trials like those
conducted by the Yugoslavia tribunal have been so lengthy. The judges fear adverse
inferences about their motives from a diverse world, and especially from the extremely
suspicious populations from which the defendants are taken, whose strong priors are that
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the judges are stooges of the powerful nations. This concern leads the judges to refrain
from restricting the defense, and the trials last for years. 132
The amount of process granted in a trial is a function of all the factors that we
have discussed—the independence of the judge, the availability of defense lawyers, the
extent of the right to make a case and cross-examine, and so forth. It is not clear whether
each element is essential or whether granting more of one element can make up for less
of another; this is perhaps true in some cases but not others. Each factor is context
specific. It may be necessary to deny an articulate and charismatic defendant the amount
of time available for testimony that is given to a regular defendant. Publicity and even
lawyers may have to be dispensed with when the evidence consists of secret materials; in
this case, a judge from an out-of-power party may nonetheless serve to constrain the
government appropriately. Again, an independent judiciary may be inappropriate when it
is tainted—a common problem for trials in transitional regimes—and then a dependent
judge will be used; but other protections, defense lawyers, for example, may compensate
for the subservient judge.
IV. Variations on the Political Trial
A. Trials of Enemy Combatants
Nations have traditionally detained soldiers captured during a war for the duration
of hostilities, and tried and punished enemy soldiers who have committed war crimes.
These trials have elements of political trials and ordinary trials. On the one hand, enemy
soldiers tried for war crimes are usually granted the same process that one’s own soldiers
are granted, and the laws of war are generally accepted by nations.133 On the other hand,
prosecutions of soldiers reflect military and political goals, more so than prosecutions of
ordinary criminals, which may be discretionary by formal law, but are usually a matter of
routine, reflecting broad nonpartisan considerations such as the seriousness of the crime
132

See Meernik, supra; for a discussion of some of the problems, see Jacob Katz Cogan, International
Criminal Courts and Fair Trials: Difficulties and Prospects, 27 Yale J. Int’l L. 111 (2002), and especially
his discussion of the case of Tihomir Blaskic before the ICTY, id., at 122-24. The defendant was unable to
acquire apparently exonerating documents from the Croatian government, and he was convicted. The
documents came to light after a change in regime in Croatia; Blaskic claims that the prior regime withheld
the documents in order to deflect suspicion from its own officials to Blaskic. See also Testimony of Larry
A. Hammond before the House International Relations Committee, February 28, 2002 (discussing the
Blaskic case and other cases like it).
133
As required by the Geneva Conventions.

56

and the availability of resources. Immunity is granted to enemy soldiers with intelligence
value, technical expertise, managerial skills, and other characteristics that are important
to some new war effort or the return to peace. For example, the U.S. granted immunity to
Japanese researchers who had conducted experiments involving vivisection on POWs, a
price deemed worth paying for their results.134 And the victorious army rarely prosecutes
its own soldiers for war crimes.
The laws of war extend their protection only to soldiers who meet certain
qualifications. They must wear uniforms, carry their weapons openly, belong to a
regularly constituted military unit, and meet related criteria. Soldiers who violate these
rules are considered spies, guerillas, or, in the current phrase, “unlawful combatants,” and
deprived of the rights enjoyed by POWs. Shortly after its entry into World War II, the
American military set up a military commission to try German soldiers—including one
American citizen—who had snuck onto American territory in order to engage in
sabotage.135 This type of military commission need not comply with the requirements of
the Geneva Convention—for example, it may have less process than the tribunals used
for POWs who commit crimes. After the September 11 terrorist attacks, the U.S.
government has claimed the right to classify Americans and foreigners as unlawful
combatants and to detain them until the end of hostilities. The government also
established new military commissions that would have the authority to try American and
foreign enemy combatants—members of Al Qaeda and affiliates—for war crimes.136
The U.S. government’s 9/11 strategy has received a great deal of criticism. Many
critics argue that al Qaeda terrorists should be treated as criminal suspects, and, when
captured, given the same process as regular criminal defendants.137 Although the courts
have not gone this far, they have demanded that the government grant unlawful
combatants more process than the government was initially willing to give them.138 The
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debate, within the courts and outside them, has emphasized the unfairness of denying
process, and the demands of military exigency.139
The theory that I have advanced sheds light on this debate, albeit from a different
angle. One question—why the 9/11 strategy reflects a military rather than law
enforcement approach, when similar actions during earlier wars were undertaken mainly
by law enforcement—can be easily answered.
First, the public believes that the threat posed by al Qaeda is enormous; for that
reason, it will tolerate a reduction of political competition in order to enable the
government to counter the threat. By contrast, the public has had more mixed views about
the threats posed by domestic communists, anarchists, and members of other fringe
movements. World War I and the Vietnam War had less public support than the war on
terror because America’s enemies did not pose as palpable a threat.
Second, members of al Qaeda are, for the most part, ethnically and religiously
distinct from Americans. As long as the government focuses its investigative efforts on
Arabs, Muslims, and aliens from Arab and Muslim countries, and the American public
believes that the government’s attention is confined to these types of people, the vast
majority of the public itself will feel unthreatened by politically motivated prosecutions.
By contrast, World War I-era prosecutions often targeted ordinary Americans, especially
those affiliated with the labor movement, which enjoyed widespread support.
In these two ways, the closest precedent for the effort against al Qaeda is the
internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II. Both cases involved high and
palpable risks to American civilians on American territory; and both cases involved an
unassimilated, ethnically distinct and politically weak group, which could be targeted for
special measures without creating the risk that such measures would be used against
mainstream Americans, not even (during World War II) German- and Italian-Americans
who were more numerous and more assimilated, and had greater political power.140
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Third, the war against terror is a bipartisan effort, and the government cannot
credibly accuse the opposition party—the Democrats—of being supporters of al Qaeda,
so the government cannot plausibly classify Democrats as enemy combatants. The
current situation bears no resemblance to the Sedition Act prosecutions, which were
brought by Federalists who believed that the Republicans had allied themselves with
France, then America’s enemy in an undeclared war.141 Nor does it even resemble the
Cold War, when Republicans could castigate the Democrats for being soft on
communism but never tried to bring criminal charges against mainstream Democratic
opponents.
All of this suggests that reduced process protections during the war against terror
do not provide the Bush administration with real opportunities for targeting political
opponents; thus, few people regard the trials and detentions as motivated by partisan
political objectives. To be sure, these trials and detentions may be mistaken, unfair,
opportunistic, and political in the sense of being designed to show the public that the
government is doing something when it’s really not doing much. But this doesn’t
distinguish them from ordinary law enforcement practices. As long as al Qaeda and
similar groups pose a genuine public threat, and as long as these groups are unable to
acquire significant support from mainstream Americans, the reduction in process
protections tolerated by the courts so far can be explained using the instrumental theory
of liberal legalism.
B. Transitional Trials
Transitional trials are easily understood within the instrumental framework I have
been discussing. The transitional government faces a delicate situation: it must, on the
one hand, satisfy demands for substantive justice against the old regime, and eliminate
the influence of remnants that continue to hold important positions in the military,
bureaucracy, and economy. On the other hand, the transitional government must avoid
the accusation that it is using transitional trials to do what the old regime did: eliminate
political opponents through a perversion of the judicial process. Transitional governments
have balanced these considerations in several ways.
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First, the government relies on the exceptional nature of the transition and the
crimes of the members of the old regime. Their chief crime (in a moral sense) was the
rejection of liberal legality; they are being punished, in part, for that crime. The public
watching the trial need not infer that ordinary individuals will be similarly denied due
process once the transition has been completed and the regime has entered the phase of
normal politics. Retroactivity, in a paradoxical way, reduces concerns of political
motivation by indicating that younger people untainted by the past have nothing to fear
from the courts.
Second, the government grants the defendant as much process as is compatible
with the retroactive nature of the trial. This is not trivial, involving the assignment of a
lawyer, the chance to testify and cross-examine, publicity, and so forth. A government
bent on eliminating its political opponents would not give them these rights.142 The lesson
is that the government may, and should, exercise restraint when pursuing its political
opponents. This may seem like a modest lesson, but it is an important one in states
emerging from decades of totalitarianism.
Third, governments rely heavily on legal fictions to conceal the political
motivation of the prosecutions. I will say more about this tactic in Part IV.C., below.
Finally, some governments use administrative proceedings rather than trials. In
Czechoslovakia, for example, administrative proceedings were used to identify and
“lustrate” former officials and collaborators, who were deprived of positions in the
government but could resume a normal life.143 These proceedings reduced both process
and punishment. The government thus could not take advantage of the limited process in
these proceedings to eliminate its political opponents, only to embarrass them, and the
embarrassment was anyway connected to the source of the transitional government’s
legitimacy—the decisive public rejection of the old regime.
C. Pedagogical Trials
Much discussion of political trials concerns a second-order issue: the educational
message that they send to the public. Uncomfortable with the notion that a trial could
142
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ever be justified by public demands for retributive justice or the dangers posed by a
public threat, scholars have instead focused on how political trials may teach the public
liberal values. Four examples will illustrate this argument.
First, Jon Elster and other scholars argue that transitional trials may be justified as
a way to educate the public about the rule of law.144 Observers of the transitions feared
that liberal democracy would not take hold in societies in which the rule of law had been
repudiated for decades. By conducting fair trials of members of the old regime,
transitional trials would dramatically show that the rule of law extends even to its
enemies.
Second, Judith Shklar argues that the Nuremberg trial was justified as a device for
creating new norms of international illegality.145 Prior to those trials international law did
not prohibit genocide and other crimes against humanity; the trial helped established that
this behavior was criminal. In doing so, the Nuremberg trial helped extend international
law beyond its traditional application to states and into the realm of human rights.
Third, several scholars have pointed out that the Nuremberg trial placed “on the
record” thousands of archival documents that showed how the Nazis engineered the
Holocaust.146 Truth is a liberal virtue, and documenting atrocities is thus a liberal duty.
This argument was used by those who supported the establishment of the tribunals
charged with trying perpetrators of crimes against humanity in the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda.147
Fourth, many domestic political trials have been intended to teach the public
about emerging threats. The trials of Jeffersonian Republicans were intended to show that
the defendants were in league with America’s enemy, France. The trials of Nazi
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sympathizers and Communists were intended to show Americans that the Nazis, then the
Communists, posed a threat to American security.
The Conflict Between Proof and Pedagogy. The educational purpose of political
trials is different from their main purpose, which is to counter public threats or do
substantive justice, but not necessarily inconsistent with it. However, in practice the main
purpose of the trials take precedence, and obscure their educational impact. As several
critics have noted, the transitional trials might be interpreted not as a vindication or even
illustration of the rule of law, but as the opposite: that judicial process and the rule of law
can be disregarded when the defendants are political opponents.148 After all, these trials
resulted in the conviction of people for activities that did not violate any law at the time
that they occurred. This apparent dilemma has also bothered critics of international war
crimes trials who fear that the educational purposes of these trials may corrupt the
judicial process.149
The criticism is too simple, but it does have an element of truth. The trials were
meant to show, in part, that the old regimes’ great sin was their disregard of liberal
legalism; not to punish members of the old regime would also send the wrong message,
as it would indicate that tyrants are not punished for their tyranny. The lesson of the
transitional trials was that, if political opposition may be tolerable within the constraints
of a liberal constitutional order, the rejection of liberal democracy is never tolerable.
This message was not, however, delivered in the most candid way. Rather than
forthrightly announcing that certain political beliefs and systems would not be tolerated,
the governments surrounded the judicial proceedings with legal fictions. The fictions
implied that the defendants were being tried and punished for committing crimes
recognized as such during the old regime.
In the trials of East German border guards, for example, many jurists claimed, and
some judges held, that the conviction could be based on prior law—including
international treaties such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
international jus cogens norms against human rights violations, West German law on the
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theory that East German law was never valid because East Germany never had
sovereignty, natural law, and East German law that on its face could be interpreted as
prohibiting the border killings.150 These were all subterfuges: the ICCPR and jus cogens
norms were never thought to apply to domestic prosecutions like the border guard cases;
and East German law, whose pre-unification domestic validity was acknowledged by
West Germany in the unification treaty, authorized the border guards to kill people who
were trying to escape. Academics who recognize the force of retroactive justice in the
transitional setting nonetheless find the lack of candor intolerable. Let the governments
prosecute the remnants of the old regime for the misery they inflicted, says Jon Elster; but
make them admit what they are doing.151 Hannah Arendt anticipated this reaction with
nearly identical comments about the Eichmann trial: don’t pretend that Eichmann broke
the law; admit that the motivation for the trial was revenge.152
These criticisms reflect the worry that the trials will not educate people if they
send muddy or mixed messages. But we can see why it is unwise to use political trials for
educational purposes by asking why the German government and courts did not follow
Elster’s recommendation. Surely, the government’s main concern was obtaining
convictions—both to appease longstanding outrage at the actions of the border guards in
West Germany, and to show East Germans that such behavior would no longer be
tolerated. The judges appeared to have seen the force of these goals, but their jobs were to
enforce the law, not implement official policy, and it is hard to imagine them candidly
announcing that they would order the border guards to jail even though they broke no
law. The educational goal of the trials ran up against the bureaucratic realities of a
modern liberal state.
Making a Historical Record. One purpose of the Nuremberg trial was to provide a
record of the Holocaust.153 The extensive German documentation of the concentration
and death camps could be entered into the record of the trial; films of the atrocities were
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also shown.154 The French referred to their trial of Klaus Barbie as a “pedagogical trial”
because its purpose was to teach the public about French complicity in the Holocaust.155
But as the Nuremberg trial shows, the efforts to provide a record of history
conflicted time and again with the much more important goal of proving the charges. The
Nuremberg and Tokyo prosecutors sought as defendants representatives of important
segments of the population. The German and Japanese publics needed to learn that the rot
had spread throughout the military, the bureaucracy, and the industrial elite. A trial of
four army generals would not be as effective as a trial of one general, one admiral, one
diplomat, and one industrialist. At Nuremberg, Justice Jackson sought to implicate
German industry; but when a natural choice—Adolf Krupps—turned out to be too ill to
stand trial, Jackson’s demand that his son Gustav be substituted outraged the judges, and
they refused.156 In Japan, the prosecutors made sure to charge not only representatives of
each component of the Japanese government, but also to make sure that there was
representation for each time period—during the attack on Manchuria as well as the attack
on Pearl Harbor, when government officials had changed in the meantime.157 These
choices all contributed to a satisfying narrative arc, but they also made the government
vulnerable to the argument that the trial was intended for propaganda, not to establish the
truth.
Nuremberg illustrates other compromises. Because the trial had to be conducted
with dispatch, many atrocities were not discussed: the records had not yet been
discovered.158 Because the prosecutors relied on documentation rather than witnesses,
undocumented but amply witnessed events were also downplayed. Most important, each
state had different preferences about which events to emphasize and which to suppress.
For the Russians, the goal was to show the world the extent of the sacrifice of the Russian
people, and to conceal Russian aggression against Poland and other innocent states, and
Russian atrocities. This was not the aim of the Americans, who preferred to emphasize
the guilt of German leaders for waging aggressive war, not against the Russians in
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particular, who were also guilty of this offense. A similar problem arose over the charge
that the German invasion of Norway was part of its conspiracy to engage in aggressive
war; the Nazis responded that they had merely preempted a British and French invasion
of Norway—which was true, and embarrassing to the British, who refused to release
secret documents to the defense that would have validated its claim.159 Events that placed
the victors in a bad light were suppressed as much as possible, and indeed the indictment
included a charge that the Germans had massacred the Polish officers at Katyn Forest,
even though everyone suspected the Russians.160 As is always the case in trials, the
establishment of the truth, in all its nuance and complexity, is subordinated to the
immediate goals of proving or refuting the charges.161
Teaching Moral Lessons. Even when the truth comes out, it does not necessarily
follow that the right lessons will be learned. The allies initially hoped that the Nuremberg
trial would teach the Germans and their own publics that the German leaders were evil:
that there was no possible justification for their behavior. The dual goals were the
education of the Germans about their own leadership, so that they could reconcile
themselves to a new order where Germany would be ruled by foreign powers or else have
greatly reduced international status; and vindication of the political leadership of the
allied countries.162
Thus, throughout the trial the prosecutors and judges feared that the defendants
would argue that (1) the war crimes committed by the Nazis were matched by war crimes
committed by the allies; and (2) Germany’s behavior was justified by the Versailles
treaty, and was abetted by the British and the French during the 1930s, who ratified many
of the formal violations of the Versailles treaty by the Germans, and further by Russia,

159

Marrus, supra, at 138-39.
Id., at 56-57. The Soviets subsequently presented witnesses testifying as to German responsibility for the
massacre, but when they tried to prevent the Germans from providing their own witnesses, their motion
was refused by the tribunal. Id., at 100-01.
161
For another example taken from the Klaus Barbie trial, see Douglas, supra, at 189 (discussing the way
that the requirements of legal form caused prosecutors to downplay the most serious aspects of Barbie’s
crimes). Osiel provides further examples from the Barbie, Nuremberg, Eichmann, and Argentine junta
trials, supra, at 79-141.
162
Richard H. Minear, Victors’ Justice: The Tokyo War Crimes Trial 13-14 (2001) (quoting Jackson’s
statements at the London Conference where the Nuremberg charter was drafted).
160

65

which cooperated with Germany in many ways.163 Although not many citizens of allied
nations would be receptive to these arguments, German citizens might have been; thus,
the trial, like the Versailles treaty itself, could become a rallying point for
unreconstructed Nazis and nationalists in Germany.
Although the defendants did make these arguments, they did not have the
expected effect. The Germans at first ignored the trial, regarding it as irrelevant or an
exercise in allied propaganda. But then something surprising happened: the Germans
began to feel that they were themselves on trial. The trial made clear the vast
participation of ordinary citizens in the Nazi extermination machine.
That had never been Jackson’s intention. He, like many others, had hoped to
prune out Nazism and induce healthy growth in remaining Germany. The idea of
German guilt had not appeared in the indictment. It had emerged during the
trial.164
But a guilty nation was not a nation that could rejoin the world community as a liberal
democracy. If there was something wrong with Germans, how could they be given
political responsibility? And the notion of German guilt would become particularly
difficult for the Americans as it became clear, part way through the trial, and to the
premature delight of the defendants, that the Germans would be America’s allies in the
gathering Cold War against the Soviet Union.165 Polling data suggest that the Germans
initially thought that the trial was fair, but after a few years there was a dramatic change
in attitudes and by the 1950s the dominant view was that the trials were unfair and the
convictions were victor’s justice.166
The Tokyo war crimes tribunal had the opposite but equally unwelcome effect.
The Japanese did not feel themselves on trial, or guilty, though they were horrified when
they learned about the atrocities committed by their soldiers. But as bad as their soldiers
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were, they did not seem any worse than the Americans, who had killed hundreds of
thousands of civilians through fire bombing and atomic bombing. The trial gave the
defendants an opportunity to defend Japan’s militarism, an opportunity seized by Tojo,
and with great success.167 Tojo argued that Japan had acted in self-defense against
colonial aggression. “Only victor nations sat on the Bench, many of them colonial powers
with far longer records of imperialism than Japan—and they allowed the colonies they
were intent on regaining no place among the judges.”168 The trial suggested the moral
equivalence of the victors and vanquished with respect to aggression, but the victors had
a monopoly on hypocrisy.
A great problem for the Tokyo trials was the decision by the U.S., made prior to
the initiation of the trial, to allow the Japanese emperor to retain his throne. As a result,
he could not be on trial, even though he was the one person who had formal—and
probably personal—responsibility for all aspects of Japan’s aggression. Trying to tie
together disparate defendants in a conspiracy when the one person they had in common
was absent was a nearly impossible task.169 The U.S. had its reasons for immunizing the
emperor: American officials believed that a cooperative emperor was their best means for
persuading Japan to surrender and then governing it. Here, as at Nuremberg, the need to
cooperate with defeated officials and leaders warred with the desire to do justice, and the
result was a message with little educative value, at least little that would directly serve the
interests of the U.S. The trial was widely regarded as a political failure.170 Japanese
citizens did not see the trial as a vindication of the rule of law but as victor’s justice. The
trial contributed to a resurgence of nationalism during the postwar years.171
However, nationalism did not reassert itself in all quarters, and one historian
argues that the trial—because it was a caricature of justice—contributed to postwar
Japanese pacifism. “The crimes revealed by the trial, compounded by the perception that
this was a world gone mad with violence and that such crimes against peace and
humanity were not unique to Japan, reinforced the deep aversion to militarization and war
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that had come with defeat.”172 If this was the lesson that the Japanese drew from the trial,
it certainly was not the lesson intended by the Americans, who sought to remilitarize
Japan as an ally against the Soviet Union, and who not only abandoned further war
crimes prosecutions after the Tokyo trial was over, but (like in Germany) cooperated with
and supported war criminals, including a future prime minister, who could be useful in
the Cold War.173 Political trials may have an educative function, but this function is often
out of the hands of those who conduct them.
Why Education? The educative performance of political trials thus has a sorry
history. Whether or not they result in convictions, they never teach exactly the kind of
lesson that the government has in mind. The question, then, is why might a government
be willing to undergo the risk of a trial to educate the public; why not send educative
messages through propaganda, official statements, and other routine channels? Or if the
government does want to discover and publicize the truth about historical events, why not
use truth commissions?174
One answer is that the government believes that it can win a public political
contest with its enemies; and the trial becomes a forum, like a legislative house, where a
policy debate is engaged. The value of the message is heightened if the defendant has a
fair chance to refute it but fails to win over the public even though his life or freedom are
at stake and so he is a natural object of sympathy. To be sure, the government cannot
present its message in as unadulterated a form as a propaganda message; but the message
of the trial, because of the presence of the defendant, is more credible if it succeeds.
This argument is similar to the instrumental theory advanced earlier. The earlier
argument held that political trials occur because governments need to maintain their
credibility—that they serve the interest of the public, and are not merely interested in
eliminating partisan opponents—when attempting to counter public threats. In the current
argument, the defendant himself is not necessarily a real threat, but his message is. The
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government gives the defendant the chance to publicize his views because the
government believes that the public will reject them.
This argument helps explain why international political trials are always promoted
and conducted by liberal democracies—which might seem paradoxical, given the rarity
of domestic political trials in liberal democracies, and their frequency in authoritarian
states. The explanation is that the liberal democratic system has greater international
appeal than any particular authoritarian system, because authoritarian systems always
elevate the interests of some national or religious or ideological group; democratic
systems are, in principle, universalistic. Every international political trial has been
intended as a story about how an authoritarian government led its people astray, and, by
implication, about how liberal democracies are superior. The creators and managers of
trials are not always correct; sometimes, a trial does not convince anyone of anything.
But the greater appeal of trials to democratic governments is easily understood.175
D. International Criminal Trials.
1. General Considerations
The international criminal trial176 is a special type of political trial. The
“defendant” is now a soldier or former leader of a (usually) defeated state; the
prosecuting “government” is now a foreign power, or a coalition of foreign powers,
which vanquished the other state. The victor’s main goal is to eliminate the hostile
government of the defeated state—its leaders and its supporters. The purpose of the trial
is to define the category of individual, government, or state behavior that will not be
tolerated by the victors, so that the rest of the world will understand what kind of
behavior will elicit an international military response and what kind of behavior will not.
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The Nuremberg trial, for example, was an ambitious effort to define new rules of
international conduct that would make a repetition of the two world wars impossible. The
world wars were blamed in part on great power rivalries, and the understanding that
states were permitted to go to war for political objectives. Thus, one of the Nuremberg
charges was violation of the crime of “aggressive war.” And the conduct of World War
II, with the German government’s mass slaughter of its own citizens as well as foreign
citizens, led to the invention of “crimes against humanity.” These two crimes, and the
notion that individuals (as opposed to states) could be charged for violating them, were
all innovations.177 Ideally, if individuals in future knew that they could be punished for
the crimes of aggressive war, crimes against humanity, and also ordinary war crimes
(also a subject of the Nuremberg trial, but not an innovation), they would be deterred
from starting wars or conducting them too brutally.
The Nuremberg trial had many of the elements of domestic political trial. The
victorious governments, led by the United States, sought to accomplish two things. First,
they wanted to eliminate the major Nazi figures. This could have been accomplished with
summary execution—an option that was widely discussed and seriously considered. But
there was a second goal as well. This was to show the world, including the citizens of
Germany, the citizens of the victorious nations, and the governments of other countries,
that there would be a new international order, one in which governments would not be
permitted to engage in aggressive war (that is, use military force to disturb the status
quo), commit war crimes, and commit atrocities against their own citizens such as
genocide. The penalty for violation would be criminal prosecution. The flip side of this
aggressive stance was that nations that did not do any of these things had nothing to fear
from the United States and the Soviet Union, or from any other major power. Or, to
shoehorn this analysis into the earlier categories, legitimate international political
competition could no longer involve aggressive war or crimes against humanity.
The advantages of holding an international criminal trial after World War II can
now be seen. The trial would show that the victorious powers were not interested in
177

Prosecutors claimed that the Kellogg-Briand pact could provide the basis for the crime of aggressive
war, but that agreement was not understood to create legal obligations, and certainly not criminal law
applying to individuals, and was in any event a dead letter.

70

eliminating any person who happened to be a threat to their international ambitions, nor
even in exercising the traditional victor’s prerogative of taking retribution or revenge.
The victorious powers sought to punish only those who had, through their actions,
endorsed the notions that aggressive war, genocide, and similar actions were legitimate
forms of international action. To persuade the world of their good faith, the victorious
powers had to give the defendants an opportunity to be heard, to show that they had not
engaged in the actions that, under the new order, would be considered crimes. Otherwise,
the world would have no reason to believe that the victors sought to create a new
international order that involved some self-restraint on their own ambitions.
This was the ideal, but the managers of the trial ran into trouble from the
beginning. None of the victors had acted consistently with the new rules that they were
now pressing on the Germans, so the world might understandably react with skepticism
to the victors’ claims that the rules were sustainable. Russia had engaged in aggressive
war against Poland, Finland, and the Baltic states; the United States had dealt with its
own internal racial problems with highly oppressive laws that could be likened to crimes
against humanity; and all sides had committed atrocities in their conduct of the war.
Within limits, the charges could be qualified; the Americans, for example, insisted that an
element of the crime against humanity is that the atrocities occur in a wartime setting, so
as to avoid the charge that America’s racial laws were crimes against humanity. The
defendants could, and did, try to make an issue of these inconsistencies; they could, and
were, shushed by the courts; but the fact remains that the rest of the world knew about
them. The problem was not so much one of victor’s justice, but a more basic problem
about world order. If the states that were pressing for new norms of international conduct
had never complied with them, what reason was there to think that they could be
sustainable?
At roughly the same time, the managers of the Tokyo trial were running into
similar problems. The goal of this trial was the same as the goal of the Nuremberg trial:
to eliminate powerful and influential people in the Japanese government and show that
their elimination was tied to their violation to new norms of international legality which
would provide the basis for a peaceful world order. The problem was, again, that the
United States as well as Japan had committed war crimes, and, although Japan had
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clearly brought war to the United States, the roots of this war could be traced to a
competition between two great powers for colonial influence in the west Pacific. No clear
norms differentiated the conduct of the United States and Japan—Japan had Nanking, the
United States had Hiroshima. These points were made by one of the dissenters, Justice
Pal.178 For Pal and other critics such as Shklar, the difference between Nuremberg and
Tokyo was that the Germans engaged in mass extermination of their own citizens; the
Japanese did not (though they did kill thousands of foreign citizens).179
The literature considers Nuremberg a success and Tokyo a failure. One might
doubt this judgment, and conclude that both were failures. As noted above, neither trial
had clear, beneficial effects on public opinion; neither trial established much of a
precedent. International criminals trials would not be used against for almost 50 years. By
contrast to domestic political trials, we might infer that international political trials are
unlikely to succeed because there is no international consensus on the line between
legitimate (international) political competition and illegitimate international political
competition. A consensus of states was not willing to accept the premise, for example,
that a great power should not start a war in order to protect access to resources, as Japan
did.
If Nuremberg and Tokyo were failures, or if Nuremberg alone was a success
because of the uniquely evil behavior of the Nazis, it can be readily understood why
subsequent international criminal trials have been sparse, and not particularly successful.
The problem has always been that the U.S. and other states have been complicit in the
reign of the defeated leader or that it has been unable to obtain a complete surrender.
Noriega, Saddam, Milosevic—these are people whom the U.S. at one time or another
dealt with as legitimate leaders.180 Thus, the claim that they should be prosecuted for
engaging in illegitimate behavior rings hollow. The judges have tried to deflect charges
of bias by granting defendants an extremely high level of process, with the result that the
trials drag on for years and defendants use their trials as platforms for stirring up
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resentment and xenophobia at home.181 But no amount of process can overcome the
fundamental problem of bias, which has nothing to do with the procedures, but the bare
fact that the trials are used by strong nations to assert their international ambitions at the
expense of weak nations.
2. The International Criminal Court
If only the strongest states have the power to establish international tribunals,
determine their membership, set their agenda, and thus influence the development of
international criminal law, predictably the resulting norms of international criminal law
will reflect the interests of the strong states, not the weak states. Thus, as we have seen, at
Nuremberg crimes against humanity were tied to war in order to immunize the United
States from claims that its racial policies violated international criminal law. But weaker
states could hardly be expected to submit to such an international order, and their efforts
to gain influence have resulted in the establishment of the International Criminal Court.
The ICC has an independent prosecutor and tribunal, and jurisdiction over
international crimes committed by nationals of state parties and over international crimes
committed on the territory of state parties.182 In theory, the ICC prosecutor decides on
prosecutions in the same impartial way that ordinary prosecutors are supposed to: on the
basis of the seriousness of the crimes and the amount of resources available. What would
this mean? Prosecutors would need to make the case that the crimes that they investigate
are more serious than the crimes that they do not investigate; judges would need to
persuade the world that convictions and sentences flow impartially from the extremely
vague rules of law.
This structure avoids the obvious forms of victor’s justice, but introduces its own
set of problems. On the one hand, because the UN security council no longer chooses the
crisis that will become subject to investigation and prosecution,183 and its members who
are ICC signatories can no longer immunize themselves from prosecution, defendants
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will not be able to argue that the ICC is a tool of the great powers, used to suppress weak
states they do not like rather than weak states that are allies. On the other hand, the ICC
prosecutor and judges will be human beings with their own national origins and biases,
and eager to satisfy whichever governments determine whether they retain their positions
or obtain new ones. International politics will still determine who is prosecuted and tried,
which means that defendants will be able to argue that their trials are politically
motivated.
One might argue that the new politics of international criminal adjudication under
the ICC will reflect something like a global consensus on international crime, rather than
the views of the United States, Russia, China, Britain, France, and a few other members
of the security council. Defendants will thus be arguing against the world, not a few great
powers, and the claim of political motivation will be weaker. However, this benefit is
purchased at a high price. Because the great powers no longer see themselves as having
dominant influence over the development of international criminal law under the ICC,
they have no reason to support it.184 Thus, the main military and economic powers—
predominantly, the U.S. but also Russia and China185—have made it clear that they will
have nothing to do with the ICC, and the U.S. has gone to great lengths to undermine
it.186 Deprived both of the political support of the most powerful countries and the
military means that these countries supply, the ICC is a frail institution with a dim
future.187
International criminal trials, then, are analogous to domestic trials in a divided
state. When the public is sufficiently divided, all trials will look like efforts by the
government to eliminate its political opponents rather than vindications of community
norms incorporated in the law. In the international setting, international criminal tribunals
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will similarly look like efforts by the governments that influence the prosecutor and
judges—whether the Security Council, in ad hoc cases, or the members of the
International Criminal Court—to harass or embarrass states with contrary foreign policy
objectives. The states whose nationals are being tried will always make this charge,
however faithfully the prosecutor and judges try to carry out their duties.
This charge will be hard to deflect, not only because it is difficult to prove to the
world that it is hard to convict a criminal who has not been tried; but also because one’s
judgment of the seriousness of a crime is unavoidably political. Suppose, for example,
that leaders in a war of national liberation are responsible for deaths of thousands of
civilians, who have been inadequately separated from the battlefield, whereas the
authoritarian government on the other side has killed only a few hundred. Are the
revolutionaries’ crimes more serious because more extensive or less serious because in
the pursuit of a good cause? Would it matter if the rest of the world sided with the
authoritarian government, or with the rebels; or what if the rest of the world is split
between them?
The American experience with domestic political trials is instructive. Domestic
political trials can be politically successful only when they target extremists who can
plausibly be considered threats—in the long or short term—to American political
institutions and mainstream values. When domestic political trials are used against
mainstream political opponents, as during the Federalist period, they contribute to
political division rather than overcoming it. The Nazis, uniquely in modern history,
committed extraordinary atrocities, threatened all of the world’s major powers, and were
thoroughly defeated; in these unique circumstances, there was enough international
political consensus about the undesirability of the Nazi system to make an international
trial possible—albeit one that was heavily controlled and quite controversial. Every other
international trial has been a political failure either because it has introduced further
divisiveness into an arena where consensus was absent, or because such divisions
prevented it from accomplishing its goal.
Conclusion
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Political trials owe their uneasy status in liberal democracies to their paradoxical
role, which is to eliminate enemies of a system devoted to political tolerance. In a
political trial, the normal constraints of liberal legalism yield, with judicial and public
acquiescence, to the political imperative of self-preservation, but their relaxation also
creates an opportunity for the government to stifle legitimate political competition. Why
don’t governments, then, conduct political trials more often? The reason is that people
understand that political trials can be used for partisan purposes, and a government that
conducts political trials thus takes the risk that the public, or a large portion of it, will
withdraw support. For this reason, governments in liberal democracies conduct political
trials only when they can plausibly claim a national emergency, and the public tolerates
and approves of such trials only when it believes that the national emergency justifies
giving the government powers that it can misuse for partisan gain as well as properly use
against legitimate public enemies. Governments can further enhance their political
support, however, by granting “political process” to the defendants in political trials—the
power to make a political defense of their activities. Whether the trial is conducted for
partisan gain or public safety itself becomes an issue in the trial, and by allowing this
issue to be addressed, the government shows that it believes that its policies enjoy the
support of the public and the defendant’s views do not. The political trial is a high stakes
exercise. If the government persuades the public that the defendant and/or his views pose
a threat to the nation, then its legitimacy will be enhanced, and the threat will be
removed. If it does not, then it may lose public support and provoke a constitutional
crisis.
If this view is correct, the traditional criticisms of political trials are incorrect. It is
too simple to criticize a political trial on the grounds that the defendant is being punished
for his beliefs, or that the judge unfairly relaxes normal process protections. Political
trials can go awry, resulting in unfairness, the suppression of political competition, and
other bad consequences, but the same can be said about ordinary criminal trials if they are
poorly conducted. The instrument itself cannot be condemned on account of its misuse;
the question is how to prevent misuse.
In the case of domestic (including transitional) political trials, the real issue is
whether the government makes a plausible case that the defendant—alone, or as part of a
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group, or as a symbol for a certain message—poses a genuine threat to the constitutional
system. If not, it is reasonable to object to the trial on the grounds that the government is
using the judicial process to eliminate legitimate political opponents. But what makes the
question difficult in any case is that the government will have legitimate reasons not to
disclose all its evidence, and can point to heightened security risks that justify public and
judicial deference to its claims. In the case of international political trials, the real issue is
whether the defendants or their world view pose a threat to the international order, or at
least are likely to make it worse rather than better. On this view, the conventional wisdom
about Nuremberg is incorrect. It was not justified because it created new norms of
international crime: those norms could have been created without a trial, via
treatymaking. It was justified because, or to the extent to which, it persuaded people
around the world to abandon fascism and embrace liberal democracy, if in fact it did do
this.
The role of judges in both the domestic and international cases is, to large extent,
political. In the domestic cases, judges will not always know whether a prosecution is a
regular criminal action or a political action, but they will have their suspicions. When
they believe that the prosecution is political but are unsure whether the defendant is a
public threat or not, then they often do—and perhaps ought to—relax legal process and
demand political process. Relaxing legal process may include broadly interpreting
statutes, permitting selective prosecution or retroactive lawmaking, limiting the choice of
defense lawyer, and preventing the defendant from seeing classified evidence; or
acquiescing in military trials. Granting political process includes, chiefly, allowing the
defendant to mount a political defense—typically, that the government’s motives are
partisan and the judicial system is corrupt. As the decorum of the judicial forum yields to
the circus-like atmosphere of democratic politics, many people will be moved to
condemn the trial as a farce. But allowing politics into the courtroom may be preferable
to the stark alternatives: preventing the government from countering genuine public
threats or allowing the government to eliminate its political opponents under cover of
judicial process.
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